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1. The creation of the "at-will" doctrine is credited to Horace C. Wood, who later
presented a detailed development of the theory in his 1877 treatise, Master and Servant. H.
WooD, MAsTER AND SEvAr § 134 (1877). By the time the at-will doctrine received its first
judicial adoption by the New York high court in 1885, some jurisdictions, such as California,
already had statutorily adopted the doctrine. See infra note 5. By the end of the 19th century,
the doctrine was accepted in every jurisdiction in the United States. See Mauk, Wrongful
Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privileges, 21 IDAo L. R-v. 202, 203 (1985).
An "at-will" employee is an employee hired for an unspecified term, who works without the
protections afforded by union contracts. Because union collective bargaining agreements typically
limit the employer's right to terminate an employee to cases in which there is "just cause" (see
infra note 46), the approximately 1976 of the California work force that is unionized is unaffected
by many of the developments discussed in this article. Cal. Dept. Indus. Relations, Union Report
(1987) (publication forthcoming); CAL. LABOR MAR~xr Buu.miN STATISIcAL SurlmsamNT (Aug.
1987). See Bastress, A Synthesis and a Proposalfor Reform of the Employment At-Will Doctrine,
90 W. VA. L. REv. 319, 321-22 (1988). Nationally, approximately three-fourths of the work force
is employed "at will." Mauk, supra, at 204. However, even a unionized employee may assert a
cause of action for termination in violation of public policy. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores,
726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1983). Some workers, such as government employees who are part of
the civil service system or professors with tenure, are also outside the at-will employment sphere.
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the contrary, an employer has been free to fire an employee regardless
of motive-for bad cause, good cause or no cause at all.2 The at-will
doctrine was a logical outgrowth of the prevailing climate in the late
nineteenth century, a period marked by fast-paced industrial expansion,
laissez-faire economics, and social Darwinism.3 Concerned with natural
law concepts of contract and property law, the Supreme Court of the
United States buttressed this laissez-faire sentiment with a string of
decisions fi'ding governmental intrusion into the employment rela-
tionship violative of the Constitution.4
California followed the national trend of embracing the at-will
doctrine, becoming the first jurisdiction to provide a statutory artic-
ulation of the doctrine. 5 Even today, California law provides that "an
2. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of theLabor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 1 (1984); Madison, The Employee's Emerging
Right to Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6 Emn. RELAT. L.J. 422 (1980-81); Note,Employment-At-Will-Employers May Not Discharge At-Will Employees for Reasons that Violate
Public Policy, 1986 ARiz. ST. L.J. 161, 161 (1986) (the traditional American rule is that employersmay discharge an at-will employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong ...").
3. Mauk, supra note 1, at 202; Note, Employers Beware: The Implied Contract Exception
to the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 28 B.C.L. R-v. 327, 327 (1987) (noting that during the
mid-1800s U.S. employment law discarded earlier protections afforded by master-servant law and
focused on the contractual relationship between the employer and employee because of emergingnotions of freedom of contract and an increasing awareness of the economic value of industrialgrowth). The creation of an "at will" doctrine in the United States departed from Englishcommon law, which afforded protections to employees hired for an unspecified term. Mauk,
supra note 1, at 203; Note, supra note 2, at 164.
4. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the United States SupremeCourt, asserting notions of economic due process, invalidated a New York law setting maximum
hours of employment for bakery employees on the ground that the statute unreasonably interfered
with the right of contract between employer and employees. The Court asserted that the NewYork law was "an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees,
to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they mayagree upon with the other parties to such contracts." Id. at 61. Further, the Court found suchinterference in the "freedom of the master and employee to contract with each other in relationto their employment [relationship]" violative of the United States Constitution. Id. at 64. See
also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Supreme Court struck down afederal statute prohibiting common carriers from dismissing employees for union membership,holding that the constitutional protections prohibiting the deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law restricted the ability of government to compel persons to perform
services for another or to accept or retain the services of another. Id. at 174. By the mid-20th
century, the Supreme Court had reversed its position and upheld legislative protection of workers.
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
5. See Mauk, supra note 1, at 203. Originally enacted in 1872 as part of the California
Civil Code, former section 1999 as amended provided: "An employment having no specifiedterm may be terminated at the will of either party, on notice to the other. Employment for aspecified term shall mean an employment for a period greater than one month." 1915 Cal. Stat.ch. 433, sec. 1, at 720. In 1937, when the Labor Code was first enacted, former section 1999was virtually reenacted as section 2922 of the California Labor Code. See 1937 Cal. Stat. ch.90, sec. 2922, at 261. The at-will provision of the Labor Code has changed little from its earliest
formulation. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 532, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 15 (1988).
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employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will
of either party on notice to the other."
'6
In light of a changed social sphere with less of a laissez-faire
mentality7 and marked by a transformed employment environment,
8
the at-will doctrine has become highly criticized.9 Some of this criticism
has been effective, and the employer's once unbridled discretion has
been increasingly restricted. Significant limitations have been created
by legislative enactments. 10 More recently, the courts have imposed
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1989). Section 2922 provides: "An employment,
having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.
Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month."
Id. The Labor Code specifies, however, that an employment contract for a definite term is
terminable only for good cause. See id. § 2924.
7. See Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAc.
L.J. 759, 761 (1984) ("The early part of the twentieth century may have been seen as the zenith
of both pure capitalism and pure freedom of contract in the United States. Although neither
should be pronounced dead, this century has witnessed an erosion, or at least a softening, of
both concepts.")
8. See Mauk, supra note 1, at 204-05. Mauk notes that, because the opportunities for self-
employment have continuously decreased over this century, nearly 90% of American wage or
salary earners are dependent upon others for almost all income. Id. The importance of the
evolution of the relationship of the employer and employee cannot be over-stated. As Professor
Corbin noted:
The relations between master and servant, employer and employee, have been subject
to constant evolution during the history of Anglo-American law. It is not too much
to say that this is the most important and far-reaching manifestation of the evolution
of society, of human civilization of the legal, social, political, and economic relations
of men and women with each other.
A. CoanN, CoNrRAcTs, Ch. 34, § 674 (1960).
9. See, e.g., Bastress, supra note 1, at 320; Mauk, supra note 1, at 202; Note, Implied
Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 ST. L. REv. 335 (1974). The at will doctrine places the
United States at odds with most other industrialized nations. See Gould, Stemming the Wrongful
Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 Emp. REL. L.J. 404, 408-09 (1988) ("The western
European countries, Canada, at least in Quebec and Nova Scotia, among federally covered
employees, and Japan provide for some limitation upon employer discretion in dismissal.");
Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HLv. L. Rnv. 1816 (1980). But see Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon
the Presumption that Employment is Terminable At Will, 23 ID ao L. REv. 219 (1986-87). See
generally Comment, From Tameny to Foley: Time for Constitutional Limitations on California's
Employment at Will Doctrine, 15 HAsmqGs CONsT. L.Q. 359 (1988).
10. There is extensive legislation passed by the federal government and the California
Legislature that greatly affects the right of an employer to terminate an employee. For example,
many federal and state statutes prohibit an employer from discriminating against employees on
the basis of certain factors, such as sex, age, race, religion and handicap. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, national origin); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) (California
Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibiting discrimination against employees because of race,
color, religion, national origin, physical handicap, medical condition, ancestry, marital status,
sex and pregnancy). Thus, legislation has significantly limited the employer's freedom to terminate
at will when the motivation for discharge is contrary to "the public good." Note, supra note 3,
at 336.
Legislative action in the realm of wrongful dismissal, however, is rare. See Perritt, Wrongful
Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REv. 65 (1987). Recent legislative efforts in California seeking
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constraints on employers. As a result of these judicial efforts, a
majority of jurisdictions in the United States now recognize some non-
statutory limitations on the at-will doctrine." It is the alleged violation
of these non-statutory restrictions by the employer that gives rise to
legal actions based upon claims of "wrongful termination.'1 2
During the last decade, California stood firmly in the forefront of
judicial efforts to protect workers from wrongful termination. Through
a series of decisions by the California Supreme Court and the Cali-
fornia Courts of Appeal, the legislative pronouncement that the em-
ployment relationship in California is "at-will"' 3 became subject to an
increasing number of limitations. 4 Three distinct theories of possible
recovery for an employee alleging wrongful termination ultimately
were fashioned by the courts: termination in violation of public policy,
to limit the broad pre-Foley protections established by California courts have thus far been
unsuccessful. Legislators Fail to Deal with Wrongful Termination, The Daily Recorder, July 19,
1988, at 1, col. 1. In light of Foley's limitations on the rights of employees, perhaps the legislative
arena will take on added importance in the area of wrongful termination in the near future. See
infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
11. Mauk, supra note 1, at 204.
12. Commentators and courts use interchangeably several terms that refer to the general
category of actions that an employee may bring for claims of unjust dismissal. Mauk, supra
note 1, at 207. Here the actions are all referred to as actions for "wrongful discharge" or for
"wrongful termination," although a more specific basis for recovery needs to be alleged. See
infra note 15 and accompanying text. Further, an employee need not be actually discharged from
employment to bring a wrongful termination action. If an employee is wrongfully demoted,
transferred, or the like, the employee may claim constructive discharge, bringing a wrongful
termination action as appropriate. Constructive discharge also may arise where the employer's
conduct is so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to resign. See Brady v. Elixir Indus.,
196 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1987). See also Baxter & Farrell, Constructive
Discharge- When Quitting Means Being Fired, 7 Eum. REL. L.J. 346 (1981-82).
Of course, an employee may have other causes of action-either along with a wrongful
termination action or completely separate-that arise from tortious conduct in the workplace,
such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Bleeke, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Employment At Will Setting: Limiting the Employer's
Manner of Discharge, 60 IND. L.J. 365 (1985). Because such causes of action are not directly
affected by the Foley decision (except to the extent they take on added importance as other
avenues of recovery are limited), they are not discussed in this article.
13. See supra note 6.
14. One author has suggested that the exceptions to the at-will doctrine are so broad and
numerous that only "bad luck" prevents an unjustly discharged employee from civil recovery.
Bastress, supra note 1, at 319. Under any realistic interpretation of the judicially-crafted exceptions
to the at-will doctrine, the author greatly overstates his case. There clearly remains ample
opportunity for an employer to terminate a truly at-will employee without proof of "just cause."
Carley, At-Will Employees Still Vulnerable, 73 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 66. See also Shapiro v.
wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (affirming trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging the three bases for wrongful termination). The
exceptions, however, established that section 2922 of the California Labor Code creates a
rebuttable presumption that at-will employment is terminable at will, subject to rebuttal by
specified contract and tort theories. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 532, 249
Cal. Rptr. 5, 11 (1988).
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termination in breach of an implied-in-fact contract, and termination
in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(occasionally referred to as "bad faith breach" or "tortious breach"). 15
At the time of the resolution of Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.'6 by
the California Supreme Court, these theories of recovery had not
developed beyond their nascent stage. The undefined parameters of
each theory of recovery led to an explosion of wrongful termination
lawsuits, 17 which in turn spawned bewildering and often conflicting
judicial decisions. 18
The legal community looked forward to clarification and guidance
from California's high court in its decision of Foley.'9 Recently the
badly divided court spoke, rendering an opinion that clearly ends the
judicial expansion of tort recovery for wrongful termination law in
California. Although the majority of the court restricted tort actions
for wrongful termination in several critical ways, some common law
15. Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California
Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 65, 68 (1982).
16. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
17. Gould, supra note 9, at 405.
18. The confusion regarding the state of wrongful termination law arose for several reasons.
First, only one of the three recognized theories of recovery-discharge in violation of public
policy-emanated from a decision of the California high court. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). And that decision left several
unresolved issues. Compare Shapiro v. wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478,
199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (1984) (public policy must be grounded in statutory basis) with Hentzel
v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 295, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161-62 (1982). See also infra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text. The other theories of recovery-breach of the implied-in-
fact contract and tortious breach of an employment contract-were creations of appellate courts
and were defined and fashioned in a myriad of ways, largely reflective of the enthusiasm of the
appellate panel for wrongful termination causes of action. Compare Newfield v. Insurance Co.
of the W., 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 446, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1984) (implied-in-fact theory of
contract recovery was barred by the statute of frauds) with Steward v. Mercy Hospital, 188 Cal.
App. 3d 1290, 1295, 233 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1987) (expressly disagreeing with Newfield and
holding that an implied-in-fact employment contract is not barred by the statute of frauds). See
infra note 89. Compare Ortiz v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 852 F. 2d 383, 388
(9th Cir. 1988) (action for tortious breach may arise independently of contract breach) with
Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 548, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 18 (1988) (breach of
contract prerequisite to tortious breach cause of action).
Further, many of the appellate decisions were understandably uncertain about the state of the
law on wrongful termination, failing to distinguish causes of action based in tort from those
based on contract. As Justice Kaufman, then serving as an appellate court justice in the Fourth
Appellate District, noted:
The opinions in a number of decisions addressing liability for 'wrongful discharge'
have evinced some ambivalence, if not confusion, as to the legal basis for recovery,
often discussing in the same case theories of implied contract, violation of public
policy and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1163, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 824 (1986). See
also Mauk, supra note 1, at 206.
19. See Foley Decision is Awaited, The Daily Recorder, Sept. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Jensen,
Developments in California Wrongful Termination Law, 10 INwus. REL. L.J. 27, 28 (1988).
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rights of a discharged at-will employee survive. Indeed, recovery for
wrongful discharge based in contract may actually expand in light of
the decision. The parameters of these surviving theories will be refined
in the years to come.
This article analyzes Foley's impact on California's wrongful ter-
mination law. Section One traces the development of wrongful ter-
mination law in California, providing a synopsis of the pre-Foley state
of California wrongful termination law. As will become evident, the
pre-Foley state of wrongful termination law, particularly as it applied
to claims of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, was badly jumbled and ill-defined. The second section
examines the Foley decision, outlining the most salient features of the
opinion and highlighting the impact of Foley on each of the previously
recognized common-law bases for a wrongful termination claim. The
third section evaluates the post-Foley state of wrongful termination
law in California and delineates several key issues that remain unre-
solved after Foley. The article concludes that, although Foley represents
a clear move away from the expansionist trend of the courts in the
wrongful termination area evidenced earlier in the decade, only later
court decisions and legislative action (or inaction) will demonstrate the
degree to which employees in California will be limited in their attempts
to procure full compensation when wrongfully terminated. The scope
of most wrongful termination actions will likely be determined by
subsequent judicial interpretation of California contract law, and the
court's adherence to "modem" contract principles in Foley may signal
expanded recovery in the contract realm for the wrongfully terminated
employee. To ensure the existence of an appropriate remedy for a
wrongfully terminated employee, California contract law must be
interpreted in a manner that provides adequate compensation, and
which impedes employer efforts to evade or to unduly restrict con-
tractual liability. Further, the Foley decision may ultimately spark the
legislature into action, involving the legislative branch in an important
area that has heretofore been left largely to the courts.
I. THE STATE OF CALFoRNiA WRONGRl
TERMINATION LAW BEFORE FOLEY
California courts developed three allegediy 20 distinct bases for a
wrongful termination action: public policy, implied-in-fact contract,
20. Although each of the three causes of action arose separately, enormous overlap existed
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and covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court's
decision in Foley can only be appreciated with an understanding of
the development of these three theories of recovery.
A. The Public Policy Exception
The first nonlegislative limitation on the largely unrestricted right
of an employer to discharge an at-will employee occurred in the 1959
decision of Petermann v. Teamsters.21 In Petermann, a California
appellate court found that an employer could be liable for terminating
an employee for that employee's refusal to commit the crime of
perjury. While recognizing a broad right of an employer to terminate
an "at-will" employee without cause, 2 the court, without citation to
authority, noted that the employer's right to terminate an employee
is limited by "considerations of public policy." The court admitted
that a precise definition of the term "public policy" was not possible,
and noted that the term connotes "that principle of law which holds
that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good . . . ." 24The court
concluded that it would "be obnoxious to the interests of the state
and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer
to discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a desig-
nated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee
declined to ... [do] an act specifically enjoined by statute." The
court did not resolve whether the plaintiff's action sounded in tort or
in contract.
It was not until Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 6 that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court adopted the Petermann rationale. The court
between the cause of action for breach of the implied-in-fact contract and tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It became difficult to distinguish between these
two causes of action. See infra notes 57-61.
21. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
22. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The court stated: "Generally,
such a relationship is terminable at the will of either party for any reason whatsoever." Id.
(citation omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261
P.2d 721, 722 (1953). The Safeway case went on to explain: "Public policy means ... anything
which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty
or private property, which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy." Safeway, 41 Cal.
2d at 574, 261 P.2d at 726 (citing Noble v. Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50-51, 236 P. 529
(1928)).
25. Peternann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
26. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
999
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held that an action for wrongful termination based upon public policy
is based in tort. In Tameny, as in Petermann, the plaintiff claimed
he was terminated for his refusal to engage in criminal conduct. 27
Adopting the Petermann rationale that an action for wrongful termi-
nation lies where an employee is discharged in contravention of
"fundamental principles of public policy," the court rejected the
defendant's claim that, because the employer-employee relationship
was one founded in contract, the plaintiff's remedy for wrongful
termination should be limited to contract damages. 29 The court con-
cluded that tort damages were appropriate because liablility was not
imposed for breach of any express or implied promises in the em-
ployment agreement, but rather because the defendant breached "a
duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the
fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal statutes."3 0
In the wake of the Tameny decision, it remained unclear precisely
what constituted "public policy" for purposes of the tort cause of
action. Tameny clarified that the "public policy" exception included
situations where the employer sought to force an employee to violate
a public policy encompassed in a state statute, thereby indicating that
27. Tameny alleged that he was discharged because of his refusal to engage in an illegal
price fixing scheme. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
28. Id. at 174, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
29. Id. Some jurisdictions, while recognizing a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, treat the action as one for breach of contract, thereby limiting the
plaintiff's recovery to contract damages. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.
2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (Wis. 1983) (limiting remedy for public policy for wrongful
discharge to reinstatement and back pay). Cf. De Rose v. Putnam Management Co., 398 Mass.
205, 496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (contract damages to employee discharged in violation of public
policy not inadequate).
30. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844. See Mauk, supra
note 1, at 229 ("The public policies arise from the employment relationship itself, and not from
any condition stated in an employment contract. For this reason, actions for wrongful discharge
in breach of public policy are best characterized as tort actions .. ."). See also Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1165, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (1986).
The impact of the Tameny decision came as much from what the court declined to decide as
from what the court did decide. In a footnote in the decision, the court expressly left open the
question of whether a tort recovery would be available in a wrongful termination action for
"breach of the implied-at-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract."
The court noted that such a theory had been recognized in other jurisdictions and had been
established in California in the context of insurance contracts. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 179 n.12,
610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12. See also Madison, The Employee's Emerging
Right to Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6 Ema,. Rm.. L.J. 422 (1980-81). The Supreme
Court in a subsequent case again suggested that an action for tortious breach of contract may
lie in the employment context. Seaman's Direct Buying Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d
752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Later courts seized upon this language as grounds
to permit a tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment context. See, e.g., Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr.
123 (1984). See also infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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the public policy exception was not restricted to incidents where the
employer's conduct of terminating the employee was expressly prohib-
ited by statute." Notwithstanding the broad language used by the
Petermann court to define "public policy," later California appellate
cases disagreed about the appropriate sources of the public policies
underlying the cause of action. It was uncertain whether a wrongful
termination action had to be based upon discharge in violation of a
"public policy" encompassed in a statute, or whether "public policy"
transcended statutory definition and could include those situations in
which the court determined that the cause of action should be appro-
priate.32 The bar, the bench and the academicians expected the court
to resolve this uncertainty in its decision in Foley.
B. Implied-in-Fact Promises
The second judicially-created exception to the at-will doctrine applied
general theories of contract law and found, in certain situations, that
an employer's words or conduct created a limitation on the employer's
right to terminate at will. The general rule provides that an employment
relationship in which the duration of employment is unspecified is
presumed terminable at the discretion of either the employer or the
employee for good cause, for bad cause or for no cause. 33 At the
31. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 174, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
32. Compare Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 613, 618 (1984) (no action unless the plaintiff can establish that dismissal was caused by
refusal to perform an illegal act (as in Tameny and Petermann) or because the employer directly
violated a statute by dismissing the employee, and courts lack the power to declare public policy
in wrongful termination cases without statutory support) with Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary
Management, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1987) (the court, noting
that the legislature is not the only source of fundamental principles of public policy, permitted
employee's action where employee was terminated in retaliation for refusal to work in an
understaffed respiratory care department) and Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188
Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (permitting plaintiff's action based on the claim that she had been terminated
because of her complaints of other employees smoking in the workplace even though there was
neither a legislative provision preventing termination for such a protest nor any statute expressly
dealing with smoking in the workplace). Cf. Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d
1556, 1561, 232 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1986) (holding that "an employee can maintain a tort claim
against his or her employer where disciplinary action has been taken against the employee in
retaliation for the employee's 'whistIe-blowing' activities, even though the ultimate sanction of
discharge has not been imposed").
33. Note, supra note 3, at 331-32 (1987). The great majority of employment relationships
are entered into through oral agreements that specify wages, hours and, to a varying degree,
other matters dealing with the working conditions. These employment agreements typically fail
to specify a duration of employment. Courts usually imply an employment relationship terminable
at will when the employment contract is silent as to this term. See J. CALsm4 & J. PaMlnO,
CoNTRAcTs § 2.9 (1987). In California, an at-will relationship is presumed and implied based on
1001
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same time, the employment relationship is contractual.14 Accordingly,
the parties to the contract may mutually agree to define the terms of
the employment relationship agreement, such as by limiting the em-
ployer's right to dfhcharge the employee to cases where there is "just
cause" to do so.
s
By the time of the Foley decision, California appellate courts had
become increasingly willing to find an exception to the at-will doctrine
on the basis of an employer's explicit or implicit representations made
in the employment context. Based on these representations, employees
had been able to assert successfully that they could not be discharged
as long as their job performance was satisfactory. 6 The at-will pre-
sumption can be overcome by express oral representations by the
employer to the employee that the employee could only be terminated
for good cause. Most of the cases, however, involved allegations that
the employer's conduct and/or policies created the reasonable expec-
tation in the employee that he or she would be terminated only for
good cause. The employee thereby asserted in essence the existence of
an implied-in-fact limitation on the at-will relationship.
7
Labor Code section 2922. See supra note 6. The California Labor Code specifies, however, that
an employment contract for a definite term is terminable only for good cause. See CAL. LAD.
CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1989).
34. See infra note 142.
35. Union employees, who are protected by a collective bargaining agreement, are commonly
terminable only for just cause. See supra note 1; see also supra note 46 (discussing the meaning
of just cause). See generally Note, supra note 3.
36. See Note, supra note 3, at 340.
37. An implied-in-fact promise is created by conduct, as opposed to words, but there is no
difference in the consequences. E.A. FANswoRTH, CoTRmAcTs, § 3.10 (1982); 1 B. WrrIm,
Sume .AR oF CALFoRNIA LAW, CoNTaAcTs, § 11, (1987). And, as with express promises, the key
focus is on what the promisee has reason to believe from the promisor's manifestations. Id.
Accordingly, an assertion by the employer that he or she did not intend to create an implied-in-
fact promise not to terminate absent just cause is irrelevant if the employee reasonably so
interpreted the employer's conduct. The employer's subjective awareness that his or her repre-
sentations constitute assent to an agreement is irrelevant. The focus is on what the employee has
reason to believe based upon the actions (and/or statements) of the employer. E.A. FARN WoRTH,
supra § 3.6. This fundamental rule of contract law applies in California. See, e.g., Brant v.
California Dairies, 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133-34, 48 P.2d 13, 16 (1935); Blumenfield v. R. H. Macy &
Co., 92 Cal. App. 3d 38, 46, 154 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1979). See also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND)
oF CoTRIAcTs § 19 (1981) ("The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by
written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.") The reasonable expectations of
the parties may be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances.
California Food Serv. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App. 3d 892, 897, 182 Cal. Rptr.
67, 70 (1982). Regarding the extent to which the employer may avoid liability through disclaimers
and written employment contracts, see infra notes 163-210 and accompanying text.
Logically, this implied-in-fact theory applies in the employment context beyond the situation
where the employee asserts that she may only be dismissed for good cause. For example, if an
employer had disciplinary procedures that the employer failed to follow in terminating an
employee, an employee might successfully assert a breach of contract action upon showing that
compliance with the procedures was an implied-in-fact promise.
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The first California articulation of the implied-in-fact exception to
the at-will doctrine is found in an appellate decision, Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc.3a In Pugh, the court admitted that California law creates
a "presumption" that the employment relationship is at will.3 9 None-
theless, the court found that the presumption is overcome where the
parties agree, either expressly or impliedly, that the relationship can
be terminated only for good cause.4 The court explained that the
implied-in-fact exception is created by the confluence of several factors:
the length of service, 41 a pattern of promotions and commendations,
38. f16 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In Pugh, a managerial employee
alleged that he was discharged summarily after thirty-two years of faithful service to the company,
in contravention of the practice of the company and the assurances made to him. Id. at 318,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20. The scholarly opinion, authored by former Justice Grodin, then an
appellate court justice, contains an interesting overview of the historical background of American
employment law. Id. at 319-21, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920-22. It was not until Foley that the California
Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to decide whether an action based on the breach of an
implied-in-fact contract is appropriate in the wrongful termination context.
39. Id. at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924. See also Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App.
3d 525, 538, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11 (1988) ("Labor Code section 2922 creates a presumption that
an employment contract for an indefinite period is terminable at will.").
40. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (1981). The court explained:
The presumption that an employment contract is intended to be terminable at will is
subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This may take the form of an
agreement, express or implied, that the relationship will continue for some fixed period
of time... [I]t may take the form of an agreement that the employment relationship
will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer's
dissatisfaction with the employee's services or the existence of 'cause' for termination.
Id. The court also rejected claims that "independent consideration" is required for a contractual
limitation on the employer's right to terminate at will, noting that "such a rule is contrary to
the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration."
Id. at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25. The court later added that even if "independent consider-
ation" were required, lengthy past service would be adequate independent consideration. Id. at
327 n.20, 171 Cal. Rptr. 925-26 n.20.
41. The court did not propose any minimum tenure for the formation of an implied-in-fact
contract. Pugh had worked for his employer for over 32 years. Thus, the length of employment,
if any, needed to underlie an implied-in-fact promise claim was uncertain. Compare Harlan v.
Sohio Petroleum Co., 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (there is no per se rule barring
a short-term employee from recovering for breach of an implied contract) with Burdette v.
Mepco/Electra, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 1987) ("California courts recognize
that a combination of oral representations to an employee, longevity of employment and an
employer's written policies regarding the treatment of long-term employees can produce an
implied-in-fact promise that an employee not be discharged without good cause.") and Newfield
v. Insurance Co. of the W., 156 Cal. App. 3d, 440, 445-46, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1984) (denying
plaintiff's implied contract claim based on several factors, including the fact that the employee
had worked for the defendant for less than two years). Because an implied-in-fact promise can
arise from an employer's express statements, from the employer's conduct, or from a combination
of these, there should not logically be any threshhold tenure required before an implied-in-fact
promise can be found. The focus is on the employee's reasonable expectations created by the
employer's words and/or conduct. Further, it was unclear whether a plaintiff may prevail in an
action asserting an implied-in-fact promise by proving only one of the Pugh factors, such as
longevity. It is usually a variety of factors-employer assurances, conduct and policies-that
creates the reasonable expectation in the employee that he or she is terminable only for good
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lack of direct criticism of the employee's work, assurances by the
employer that the employee has a secure future, personnel policies of
the employer 42 and the practice of the company not to terminate
employees absent good cause.43 Finding that Pugh had alleged the
existence of most of these factors,44 the court upheld the plaintiff's
claim that a jury question45 existed about whether there was "good
cause" 6 for the discharge.
cause. But see, e.g., Robards v. Gaylord Bros., Inc., 854 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting
that longevity alone may give rise to an implied-in-fact promise).
42. Another factor frequently asserted as a basis for the formation of an implied-in-fact
promise not to terminate absent just cause is the existence of personnel policies asserting restrictions
on the employer's right to terminate at will. See, e.g., Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App.
3d 525, 538, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 13 (1988) (plaintiff asserting that employer's policy and procedure
manuals applied to his employment and provided that discharge would only be for just cause).
See also Note, The Employee Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on the Employment at
Will Doctrine, 31 VmL. L. Ray. 335 (1986); Comment, Employee Handbooks and Employment-
At-Will Contracts, 1985 Dux L.J. 196 (1985); Rohwer, supra note 7, at 768-69 ("Employee
manuals, handbooks, or other company-generated documents describing or defining terms and
conditions of employment or employment practices can provide implied terms of the employment
contracts").
43. Pugh I, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
44. The court found that Pugh had alleged the following facts from which a jury could
find an implied promise by the employer not to terminate him absent good cause: an employment
tenure of 32 years, consistent commendations and promotions, the lack of any direct criticism
of his work, assurances given regarding job security, and employer policies not to terminate long-
term employees absent good cause. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
45. Where reasonable minds can disagree, the determination of whether good cause became
an implied term in the employment contract is a question for the jury. Hejmadi, 202 Cal. App.
3d at 541, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 13. See Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135
Cal. App. 3d 896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
A congeries of factual matters must be examined and resolved in order to determine
this question [of whether there is an express or an implied-in-fact promise for some
form of continued employment absent cause for firing]. This assize should include the
documents themselves, the provisions regarding the grievance processes, the personnel
practices or policies, the employee's length of service, as well as the practice of the
industry in which the plaintiff is engaged. These factual matters are for the jury (unless
waived), not the court, to determine.
Walker, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 905, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 622 (emphasis in original). The determination
requires the jury to find that, from all the circumstances surrounding the employment, whether
by words or conduct, it is reasonable for the employee to conclude and believe (and the employee
did so conclude and believe) that employment would be terminated only for good cause. See
BooK OF APPROVED JURY INsTRUCTIoNS 10.12 (1987) [hereinafter BAJI]. As a theory founded in
the law of contracts, it is the objective manifestations of the parties, not their secret intentions,
that control. E.A. Fm,;swoRTH, supra note 37, § 3.6. The jury also must decide whether, given
the implied promise, there was "good cause" for the discharge. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at
329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28.
46. The Pugh court did not offer a precise definition of "good cause," noting that the
term means "a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party
exercising the power." Pugh I, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928 (1981). In later
litigation this definition was slightly refined; the "employer's good faith dissatisfaction alone is
not sufficient to constitute good cause.... ." Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. (Pugh fl), 203 Cal.
App. 3d 743, 769, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212-13 (1988). California courts typically have adopted
the Pugh definition of "good cause" (or "just cause"), adding that, in order for a jury to
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Pugh represented a court's effort to protect non-union employees
through the use of modem contract law.
47 Subsequent California
decisions reiterated that actions founded upon the breach of an implied-
in-fact promise not to terminate except for good cause are based purely
on contract law. 4Accordingly, plaintiff's recoverable damages were
limited to those provided for by contract law.
49
decide if there is "good cause," the jury should balance the employer's interest in operating the
business efficiently and profitably with the interest of the employee in maintaining employment.
See BAJI, supra note 45, at 10.13. This instruction correctly charges the jury with "the duty to
'balance the employer's interest in operating [its] business efficiently and profitably with the
interest of the employee in maintaining his [or her] employment ... " giving substantial weight
to managerial discretion. Pugh II, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 769, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 212. Ultimately
what constitutes "good cause" depends on the case itself and the status of the parties. For
example, generally with high level management personnel the courts permit greater leeway in
termination than with lower level employees. Pugh I, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 928 ("And where ... the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position,
the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective
judgment.") Further, "good cause" in the implied-in-fact promise context differs from the "good
cause" required for the termination of a contract entered into for a specified term. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1989) ("An employment for a specified term may be terminated
at any time by the employer in case of any willful breach of duty by the employee in the course
of his employment, or in case of his habitual neglect of his duty or continued incapacity to
perform it.").
Following the appellate court decision, Pugh received a jury trial on his claims of wrongful
termination. At his trial he attempted to base his wrongful termination action on both contract
and tort theories, notwithstanding the fact that the original appellate decision (Pugh 1) sanctioned
only retrial on the implied-in-fact contract theory. The jury returned a defense verdict which was
affirmed on appeal. Pugh II, 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988). Although the
Pugh I court upheld a non-suit against Pugh's claim that he was terminated for his refusal to
participate in negotiations for an illegal union contract in violation of public policy, finding that
Pugh's proferred evidence was "insufficient to establish a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge
under Tameny" (Pugh I, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 322-24, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 922-24), Pugh was
permitted to assert an action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in his trial because the Pugh I court "found it unnecessary to consider such an action,"
thereby not foreclosing Pugh from advancing the theory on retrial. Pugh II, 203 Cal. App. 3d
at 750-51, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
47. Pugh II, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 201 ("The Pugh I court did not
reject the rule in Labor Code section 2922 that an at-will employee can be terminated by either
party without cause, but it did advance an enlightened interpretation of the rule, thereby enabling
a private sector, non-union, at-will employee to seek a contract remedy for unjust discharge.").
48. See, e.g., Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 540, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 13
(1988); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App 3d 1155, 1170-1171, 226 Cal. Rptr 820, 825-
26 (1986) (implied-in-fact based action "constitutes nontortious 'wrongful discharge,' a breach
of the implied-in-fact promise to discharge only for good cause and, thus, a breach of the
employment contract; the damages recoverable are limited to those allowed for breach of
contract"). See also Comment, supra note 9. In essence, an implied-in-fact promise not to
terminate absent just cause constitutes a modification of the original employment contract into
which the term that the contract was terminable at will had been implied. See supra note 33.
Termination without cause thereby constitutes a breach of the implied contract term and gives
rise to an action for breach of contract.
49. Id. Recoverable damages in this context are "the amount of compensation agreed upon
for the period determined to be a reasonable period that plaintiff's employment would have
continued but for the breach of the employment contract less any compensation actually earned
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C. Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
Prior to its decision in Foley, the California Supreme Court had
never expressly held that the breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing gave rise to an action in tort in the employment
context. The supreme court had, however, twice suggested that this
might well be the case.50 In Cleary v. American Airlines5 1 a California
appellate court became the first to recognize concretely that an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed in every employment
by the employee during that period." BAi, supra note 45, at 10.15. See, e.g., Pugh II, 203
Cal. App. 3d 743, 762 n.14, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 208 n.14 ("For the breach of an obligation
arising from contract, the measure of damages is the amount which will reasonably compensate
the [appellant] for all of the economic loss legally caused thereby, or which in the ordinary
course of things will be likely to result therefrom. He may recover the total amount of wages
and benefits which would have been received under the terms of the employment contract, less
any sum which he has earned or could have earned in other employment by reasonable effort.");
Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 97-98, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225-26 (1976).
Punitive damages are not recoverable. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989). Contract
damages should include compensation for all harm flowing from the breach that was within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. Accordingly, the scope of contract
damages in the employment context may be quite significant, though courts have traditionally
been quite restrictive in this area. See infra notes 211-244 and accompanying text. In light of
Foley's limitation on the tort bases for a wrongful termination action, the proper scope of
recoverable contract damages for the breach of the implied-in-fact contract becomes of even
greater moment. Guidance will come from court decisions or by legislative action. See infra note
123 and accompanying text.
If the plaintiff pleads and proves an independent tort-based cause of action, such as defamation
or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff, of course, may be compensated with
traditional tort damages for that separate harm as well.
One author suggests that, although the implied-in-fact exception is based in contract law rather
than in the law of torts, it is the most far-reaching of the recognized exceptions to the at-will
doctrine. Note, supra note 3, at 349. The public policy exception and the "good faith and fair
dealing" exception only limit the employer's right to terminate for an improper reason; the
implied-in-fact exception may be raised when the employee asserts that he or she is being
terminated without cause. Id. While the author may be correct in a general sense, the tort causes
of action-public policy and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing-potentially provide greater recovery for the plaintiff as they permit the recovery of
damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. See infra notes 211-220 and accompanying
text. Further, the public policy-based action undisputably cannot be evaded by contract provisions
asserted by the employer, as this cause of action arises independently from the promises of the
parties. Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The degree to
which an employer's implied-in-fact contractual liability can be avoided by written contract
provisions is uncertain. See infra notes 172-199 and accompanying text.
50. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769 n.6,
686 P.2d 1158 n.6, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 n.6 (1984); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980).
51. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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relationship, and that its breach could constitute a tort.
5 2 The Cleary
court held that, because of the plaintiff's long tenure and the defen-
dant's failure to adhere to its own grievance procedures, the plaintiff
could recover tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.53 The court stated:
In the case at bench, we hold that the longevity of the employee's
service, together with the expressed policy of the employer, operate
as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such an employee
by the employer without good cause. We recognize, of course, that
plaintiff has the burden of proving that he was terminated unjustly,
and that the employer ... will have its opportunity to demonstrate
that it did in fact exercise good faith and fair dealing with respect
to plaintiff. Should plaintiff sustain his burden of proof, he will have
established a cause of action for wrongful discharge that sounds in
both contract and tort. He will then be entitled to an award of
compensatory damages, and in addition, punitive damages if his
proof complies with the requirement for the latter type of damages.Y
The Cleary court offered little support for its ready transformation of
a traditionally contract-based action into an action sounding in tort
beyond citation to cases in the insurance context that permit a tort
action.5
5
52. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 454-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 727-30. In Cleary, the
plaintiff, whose complaint was dismissed upon demurrer, alleged that. after 18 years of service
he was terminated because of the airline's disapproval of his union activities. Cleary also claimed
that, in violation of the employer's own policies and procedures, he was not afforded an
opportunity to rebut the employer's asserted, but wholly untrue, grounds for his termination
which included allegations of theft. Id.
53. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
54. Id.
55. In finding a basis for an action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing the court looked to cases decided by the California Supreme Court in the
insurance contract context. In the these cases, the California Supreme Court had held repeatedly
that the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing-requiring the insurer to
accept reasonable settlements and not to withhold unreasonably payments due under the policy-
may constitute a tort, because it is an obligation imposed by law, not by the terms of the
contract. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 56, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). See also Diamond, The Tort
of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance
Transactions?, 64 MAR. L. R.v. 425 (1981); Louderback & Jurwika, Standards for Limiting the
Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 197 (1982); Comment, Recon-
structing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CA.w.
L. REv. 1291, 1306 (1985).
A key issue thus became the extent to which the employment context approximated the
insurance context. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1984) (finding that the relationship between employer and employee is as inherently unequal as
that between insurer and insured so that the breach of the implied covenant is tortious in both
contexts). The Walis court noted that tort liability, as opposed to liability sounding in contract,
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California attorneys representing discharged at-will employees im-
mediately began asserting tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing ("tortious breach") as a cause of action
in all wrongful termination actions.5 6 Cleary left the parameters of the
tort action uncertain, and subsequent court decisions offered little
consistent guidance regarding the appropriate circumstances for a tort-
based action for breach of the implied covenant.57 While it appeared
evident that not every breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate
only for good cause gave rise to tort liability, the proper context for
tort damages was extremely hazy.5 8 Some courts created strict prere-
arises from the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only in selected
situations where several factors can be found:
For purposes of serving as predicates of tort liability, we find that the following"similar characteristics" must be present in a contract:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining
positions;
(2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to
secure peace of mind, security, future protection;
(3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not require the
party in the superior position to account for its action, and (b) they do not make the
inferior party "whole";
(4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may suffer and
of necessity places trust in the other party to perform; and
(5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability.
Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129. Other courts have permitted an action for tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the court finds a "special relationship"
approximating that of the insurer-insured. The results of those cases are uncertain in light of the
Court's reluctance to permit an action for the tortious breach in the employment context. See
infra note 107.
56. As a tort cause of action, recovery was potentially more lucrative for the discharged
employee than the Pugh-based cause of action. Both damages for emotional distress and punitive
damages were recoverable upon appropriate proof. See infra notes 211-220 and accompanying
text.
57. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 543, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 14 (1988)
("The theory of tort recovery in a contractual setting has been the source of much confusion
and uncertainty when its application has been directed to employment termination cases."). See
generally Brody, Wrongful Termination as Labor Law, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 434, 460 (1988) ("[T]he
scope and applicability of the doctrine have been something of a puzzle ever since [Cleary]");
Haggerty, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Employment
Contracts: From Here to Longevity and Beyond, 14 W. ST. L. Rnv. 445 (1987).
58. As one court explained in its attempt to clarify the distinction:
Ordinarily, where a good cause limitation for termination exists in the employment
agreement, the employee's remedy is confined to contractual damages as the harm
suffered arises from a breach of a consensual provision of the contract. However,
where the employee has pleaded and proved an express or implied good cause limitation
on the employer's right to discharge, and a breach thereof, then in certain limited
circumstances the employee may pursue a tort remedy based upon a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Hejmadi, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (emphasis added). The He/madi court
determined that the tortious breach action could only follow upon the plaintiff's proof that the
plaintiff/employee was no longer terminable at will. The court explained that in the ordinary at-
will employment relationship, in which the employee is terminable for any reason and at any
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quisites to a Cleary-based action, mandating a showing of longevity
and a violation of employer policy.5 9 Other courts shifted the focus
from the employee's period of service and from the employer's policies
to the conduct of the employer. 60 Still other courts combined both of
these approaches, looking to longevity and employer policies as giving
rise to an implied promise that the employee will be terminated only
for just cause, followed by some improper action by the employer in
effecting the discharge.61 It was believed that the California Supreme
Court would untangle and clarify this unsettled and confused area in
its decision of Foley.
II. FOLEY V. INtERAcTnv DATA CORPORATION
A. Factual Context and Procedural History
Daniel Foley, an employee working without an express employment
contract specifying the employment term, was terminated after nearly
seven years of service to his employer, Interactive Data Corporation
(IDC). Throughout his tenure, Foley received regular promotions,
time, doing that which is permissible-terminating the employee-could not constitute breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 544-48, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 15-18.
while the court's logic is at first glance persuasive, the court's approach provides no common
law legal protection to purely at-will employees who are not terminated on any grounds other
than those that would be deemed violative of public policy. See infra notes 141-51 and
accompanying text. Some courts did not restrict the tortious breach cause of action to cases in
which the plaintiff first established a Pugh limitation. See, e.g., Khanna v. Microdata Corp.,
170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
59. See, e.g., Newfield v. Ins. Co. of the W., 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445, 203 Cal. Rptr
9, 12 (1984).
60. See, e.g., Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988); Gray v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573 (1986) ("Although lengthy satisfactory
service is extremely helpful to an employee in establishing breach of a duty of fairness toward
him, that factor is not essential to the cause of action."); Rulon-Miller v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984). See also Khanna, 170 Cal.
App. 3d at 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 860. As the Khanna court explained, a Cleary-based action
may be brought by "bad faith action extraneous to the [employment] contract, combined with
the obligor's intent to frustrate the [employee's] enjoyment of contract rights." Id. at 262, 215
Cal. Rptr. at 867.
61. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1988); Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986). See also Shapiro v. wells
Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 479, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984) (in order to
recover for tortious breach there must be conduct by the employer "extraneous" to the contract).
Thus, under this approach, more than the lack of just cause was needed before a tort action
could lie.
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bonuses, pay increases, and superior performance evaluations. 62 He
alleged that because of periodic assurances of fair treatment and
continued employment, and due to IDC's "Termination Guidelines,"
which set forth the grounds for discharge along with a seven-step
pretermination procedure, he had an expectation of continued and
permanent employment with IDC. 63
Foley's discharge followed a conversation he had with his supervisor,
Richard Earnest, in which Foley told Earnest that Foley had learned
that the person who had been hired to become Foley's immediate
supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for embezzling from his former employer. 6
Earnest admonished Foley not to discuss "rumors" and to "forget
what [he] heard." Within months of this conversation, Kuhne, who
had become Foley's immediate supervior, transferred Foley across the
country, only to fire him one week later. Foley alleged that these
actions were in retaliation for Foley's disclosure of the FBI investi-
gation of Kuhne's alleged criminal conduct.65
Foley sued IDC for wrongful termination, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages. He alleged each of the three theories that the
California courts had recognized as a basis for a wrongful termination
action: A tort cause of action for discharge in contravention of public
policy, a contract action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract to
terminate only for good cause, and a tort cause of action for breach
of 'the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
sustained the defendant's demurrer to Foley's entire complaint without
leave to amend. 6
In an opinion evidencing strong antipathy for the developments that
had been taking place during the previous decade in the California
law of wrongful discharge, and warning against allowing the three
recognized common law bases for a wrongful termination action "to
swallow the [at-will] rule," 67 the court upheld the trial court's dismissal
62. Indeed, two days before being discharged, Foley received a merit bonus of nearly $7,000.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 663, 765 P.2d 373, 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
213 (1988).
63. Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
64. Id.
65. Id. Several months after discharging Foley, Kuhne pled guilty to a felony count of
embezzlement. Id. at 765 n.1, 765 P.2d at 375 n.l, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213 n.1.
66. Id. at 659, 765 P.2d at 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
67. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 28, 35, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870
(1985), rev. granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986), rev'd in part and aff'd in part,
47 Cal. 3d 354, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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of each of Foley's claims. First, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Foley's claim based on discharge in violation of
public policy. The court limited such an action to cases in which the
plaintiff alleges termination in retaliation for asserting statutory rights,
or for refusing the employer's request that the employee perform an
illegal act, or cases in which the employer "directly" violates a statute
by dismissing the employee.6s The appellate court found no statutory
basis for the plaintiff's claim and concluded that "the Legislature has
indicated by its silence that it does not intend for workers to police
their fellows." 69
The implied-in-fact contract theory received the court's most ven-
omous attack. The court explained that the recognition of a Pugh
cause of action
destroys the centuries-old solid and settled principle of vast and
demonstrated value to employer and employee, to the world of
commerce and to the public, of a contract which either can terminate
at will. To emasculate its meaning results in a contract terminable at
will only by an employee ... with little or no financial risk to him
but generally at considerable risk to the employer.
70
The appellate court also determined that, because Foley had worked
for IDC for nearly seven years, any implied-in-fact contract term
would be barred by California's statute of frauds .7  Finally, Foley's
tortious breach claim was deemed properly dismissed because neither
his nearly seven-year tenure nor IDC's procedural manual was suffi-
cient to satisfy the prerequisites of longevity of service and employer
disregard of its personnel policies.72
In 1986, the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in the
case. Given the composition of the court at that time, it is likely that
the case was granted review in order to reverse the extremely narrow
68. Foley, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870. In so concluding, the court
expressly chose to ignore Tameny's "dictum" that a non-statutory public policy could underlie
the action. Id. at 35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
69. Id. at 35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
70. Id. at 34, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 869. It is, of course, the conduct or words of the employer
that permit the creation of the implied-in-fact term that the employee will only be terminated
for just cause. See Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. Ray.
153, 154-155 (1982) ("While the implied contract approach reflects a movement away from the
harshness of the at-will rule, it by no means represents a rejection of the rule, since it merely
allows employees to rebut more easily the presumption that their employment is terminable at
will.")
71. Foley, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 35-37, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71. See CAL. CIV. CoDE §
1624(a) (West Supp. 1989) (an agreement not in writing that by its terms is not to be performed
within a year from the making thereof is invalid).
72. Foley, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 36-37, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
1011
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
approach of the appellate court, which was at odds with most of the
decisions of California's appellate courts in the area of wrongful
termination.7 3 The case was argued in November 1986. However,
before a decision could be rendered, the California electorate removed
three of the justices from the court.74 The case was reargued before a
more conservative court under the stewardship of Chief Justice Mal-
cohn Lucas in April 1987, and a badly divided court rendered its
decision on December 29, 1988. 75
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. Foley and the Public Policy Exception
In Foley, the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he
reported that the person who was about to become his supervisor was
73. The petition for hearing was granted unanimously on June 30, 1986, by a court comprised
of Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, Lucas and Panelli. Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986). The appellate decision in
Foley had given an extraordinarily narrow interpretation to all bases of California's wrongful
termination law. The appellate court offered an interpretation of wrongful termination based on
a violation of public policy narrower than that envisioned by the Tameny court, a decision in
which Chief Justice Bird and Justice Mosk had joined the majority. See supra notes 26-30. The
appellate court further attacked the implied-in-fact promise doctrine of Pugh, an opinion authored
by Justice Grodin who was then an appellate court justice. The appellate decision also gave a
miserly interpretation to the scope of an action for tortious breach notwithstanding suggestions
by the California Supreme Court that a tortious breach cause of action may be appropriate in
the wrongful termination context. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal. 3d 752, 769 n.6, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 n.6 (1984), in which
Justices Mask, Broussard and Reynoso joined the majority opinion suggesting the propriety of
a tortious breach cause of action. See also id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (Chief Justice Bird contended that an action for tortious
breach may be applicable in the context of commercial contracts). The only two justices still
on the Court at the time of the rendition of the Foley decision, who also were serving at the
time of the Seaman's decision, Justices Broussard and Mask, refused to join the majority
opinion in Foley. Further, the only two current justices also to serve on the Bird court joined
the majority opinion in Seaman's which intimated an action for tortious breach may be
appropriate in the employment context, and filed dissenting opinions in Foley. Thus, it is fair
to surmise that the petition had been granted to overturn the appellate court's restrictive
interpretation of California's wrongful discharge law. How far-reaching the Bird court's opinion
would have been will, of course, never be known.
74. The electorate voted against the retention of Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso
and Grodin in November 1986. Governor George Deukmejian subsequently elevated Justice Lucas
to the position of Chief Justice and appointed Justices Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman to the
California Supreme Court.
75. The opinion had been under submission for 20 months and was finally released on
December 29, 1988, the penultimate working day of the calendar year. The Court was badly
split with three of the justices offering stinging dissents to the majority's lengthy opinion. Since
the opinion, Justice John Arguelles, one of the justices joining the majority opinion, has left the
Court and has been replaced by Justice Joyce Kennard.
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being investigated for embezzlement from a prior employer. Foley
contended that California has a public policy in favor of reporting
relevant information about co-workers to management.76
The Foley court adhered to the precedent of Petermann and Tameny
by acknowledging the existence of a tort cause of action for the
termination of an employee in contravention of public policy.7 7 The
court explained that "an employer's right to discharge an 'at will'
employee is still subject to limits imposed by public policy, since
otherwise the threat of discharge could be used to coerce employees
into committing crimes, concealing wrongdoing, or taking other action
harmful to the public weal."' 78 The court also specified that the public
policy-based action sounds in tort,79 explaining that "[w]hat is vindi-
cated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises arising
out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the
public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition
of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner
contrary to fundamental public policy." 80
Beyond explicitly recognizing the existence of this tort cause of
action, the court provides little guidance as to what precisely constitutes
a "public policy" for purposes of the cause of action. The court
acknowledged that Tameny suggested that an action based upon
"considerations of public policy" be permitted." The court further
recognized the division among the lower courts about the genesis of
an appropriate "public policy."8 2 Nevertheless, the court expressly
declined to decide "whether a tort action alleging breach of public
76. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 669, 765 P.2d 373, 379, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 217 (1988).
77. By so doing California continued to adhere to the most widely recognized common law
exception to the at-will doctrine. Bastress, supra note 1, at 326. See also Mauk, supra note 1,
at 228 n.20 (listing jurisdictions that adhere to public policy exception). While the employment
relationship remains ostensibly "at will," this theory ultimately disallows certain bad faith
terminations-dismissals where the discharge is violative of some public policy.
78. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 665, 765 P.2d at 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
79. The court again adhered to the rationale of Tameny, noting that the action sounds in
tort, as opposed to contract, because the cause of action does not involve a breach of a promise
set forth in the contract itself. Rather, the focus is on a breach of a duty imposed by law, a
duty for the employer not to act in contravention of "fundamental public policies." Id. at 667,
765 P.2d at 378, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 216. The court went so far as to criticize the courts in other
jurisdictions that limited the public policy-based cause of action to contract damages, noting that
these jurisdictions "failed to draw the distinction between contract-based causes of action and
those based on policies extrinsic to the terms of the agreement." Id.
80. Id. at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d at 377 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.7.
81. Id. at 668, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal Rptr. at 216 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d 1330, 1333, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1980)).
82. See supra note 32.
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policy under Tameny may be based only on policies derived from a
statute or constitutional provision or whether nonlegislative sources
may provide the basis for such a claim. "83 Instead, the court deter-
mined that, even where the plaintiff alleges a statutory basis for the
action,84 the proper focus is on whether there is such a "substantial,"
"fundamental," and "basic" public policy being implicated that a
court is justified in imposing tort damages upon the employer.85
It is not sufficient that the asserted interests are both "substantial"
and "fundamental"-the policy raised has to be "public" as well. 86
Applying this "rule" to the facts before it, the court simply noted
that there is no "substantial public policy prohibiting an employer
from discharging an employee for performing [the duty to communi-
cate relevant information to the employer]." 87 The court focused on
the relationship of the parties involved and found that there was no
public interest involved, only a private matter between Foley and his
employer.88
The criteria for determining whether a public policy is substantial
enough and, more critically, "public" enough, for the purposes of an
action is muddy at best, and will be clarified only by further litigation.
Subsequent cases must now focus on the public/private dichotomy,
without any clear guidance about how this is to be determined.
2. Foley and Implied-in-Fact Promises
The court upheld, and apparently strengthened, the validity of the
Pugh cause of action,89 permitting Foley to proceed on his claim that
83. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. One author suggests
that the relevant public policy arises from "common law notions of justice in the work place,"
"implied as necessary and consistent with a body of law providing rights and protections in the
employment context generally." Mauk, supra note 1, at 228-29.
84. Foley claimed a statutory basis for his action, noting that the Labor Code required that
he, as an agent, use "ordinary care and diligence" while employed. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2854.
(West Supp. 1989). Foley contended that "ordinary care and diligence" could only be met if he
divulged relevant information to his employer. The Court did not determine whether Foley's
interpretation of the statutory obligation was sound. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
85. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
86. Id. The court acknowleged that "[e]ven where, as here, a statutory touchstone has been
asserted, we must still inquire whether the discharge is against public policy and affects a duty
which inures to the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee." Id.
87. Id. at 670, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218. Although there were three dissenting
opinions, only one of the dissenters, Justice Mosk, disagreed with the dismissal of the public
policy cause of action. Id. at 723-24, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 670, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
89. The court specifically held that "Pugh correctly applied basic contract principles in
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IDC's conduct and personnel policies created an implied-in-fact con-
tract providing that Foley be terminable only for "good cause." ' 9
As a contract doctrine, the parties are free to agree to a relationship
terminable at will or subject to limitations. Although an employment
relationship not specifying any term is presumed terminable at will,91
the court noted that "the absence of an express written or oral
contract term concerning termination of employment does not nec-
essarily indicate that the employment is actually intended by the
parties to be 'at will,' because the presumption of at-will employment
may be overcome by evidence of contrary intent." 92
Further, the court rejected the argument that any implied-in-fact
contract needs to be supported by consideration independent of the
employee's initial promise to render services. The court, adhering to
"modern contract law," noted that "there is no analytical reason
why an employee's promise to render services, or his actual rendition
of services over time, may not support an employer's promise both
to pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary
dismissal." 93 Thus, the court concluded that the totality of the
the employment context, and that these principles are applicable to plaintiff's agreement with
defendant." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 676, 765 P.2d at 384, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
The court first determined that the statute of frauds was no bar to such a claim because
the employment contract for an indefinite term could be performed within one year. Id. at
673, 765 P.2d at 381, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court explained: "Because the employee can
quit or the employer can discharge for cause, even an agreement that strictly defines appropriate
grounds for discharge can be completely performed within one year-or within one day for
that matter." Id.
90. Defendant, Interactive Data Corp., contended that the Court should require proof of
an express contractual provision, supported by independent consideration. Id. at 678, 765 P.2d
385, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The focus of the defendant's argument, however, is misplaced.
The implied-in-fact contract looks to the manifestation of agreement by conduct; whereas, an
express contractual provision would require mutual assent by words. J. CALum.au & J. PERLo,
CoNRACTs, at 19 (3d ed. 1987). Had Foley alleged that he and his employer expressly agreed
that the employer's termination guidelines were to apply to him, his action would be for an
express contract. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 673 n.20, 765 P.2d 373, 383 n.20, 254 Cal Rptr. 211,
221 n.20. See infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing oral modification). Despite
these differences, the effect of an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract is identical.
See supra note 37.
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1989).
92. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 677, 765 P.2d at 385, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223. It is, thus, a
question of fact based on the parties' conduct and/or statements whether the parties acted so
as to create an implied-in-fact contract. Id.
93. Id. at 679, 765 P.2d at 386, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224. The majority again adhered to
the prevailing view. Earlier courts held that if the jury finds an implied-in-fact promise not
to terminate absent just cause, there is an "obligation on the employer to not fire absent
cause or recognizable dissatisfaction ... regardless of whether there is any classic secondary
consideration or not." Walker v. Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896,
904, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622 (1982). See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25 (1981). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 &
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circumstances, including plaintiff's tenure, 94 personnel policies, and
defendant's conduct of promoting (i.e., assuring and rewarding the
plaintiff), becomes evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
an implied-in-fact contract limiting defendant's right to terminate the
plaintiff. 95
The implied-in-fact exception gains added importance under the
court's decision. After Foley, contract more than tort will be the
legal basis by which wrongful termination actions are resolved.
Accordingly, the key battleground, now that the contract cause of
action has the enthusiastic imprimatur of the high court, will be the
damages that are appropriately recoverable for the breach of the
implied-in-fact contract, 96 and the extent to which an employer may
"opt-out" of implied-in-fact contractual liability.97
Supp. 1989). Foley's employment relationship was based on an oral agreement into which a
terminable at-will status was implied pursuant to Labor Code section 2922. Foley did enter
into two collateral written agreements with his employer under which Foley was prohibited
from employment with a competitor for a year after termination of the employment relationship
and under which he would disclose computer-related information to IDC. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d
at 663, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal Rptr at 213. The court suggested that Foley's agreement to
enter into these collateral agreements may also function as "independent consideration" for
the employer's promise not to discharge Foley absent cause. Id. at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d at 387
n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.23. If no additional consideration is required for the implied-
in-fact contractual modification, the court's reference to these collateral documents appears
gratuitous. These agreements could have evidentiary value, however, as further proof that
Foley was reasonable in believing that he was not a purely at-will employee.
94. In so holding, the majority rejected the employer's claim that an employment tenure
of under seven years is too brief to underlie a Pugh action. The court stressed that the length
of employment is only one factor in the "totality of the circumstances." Foley. 47 Cal. 3d at
681, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. By so holding, the court thus rejected
previous decisions that refused to permit an employee's action based upon the determination
that the plaintiff's employment tenure was of inadequate duration. See supra note 41.
95. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The court also
noted that Foley's reliance on IDC's personnel manual and policies could be the basis from
which an agreement rebutting the at-will presumption can be inferred. Id. The court embraced
the implied-in-fact basis for recovery, disagreeing with the appellate court's determination that
the doctrine was harmful and unjust to employers. In fact, the court noted the socially
beneficial results that permitting the contract-based cause of action will have, explaining that
"employers may benefit from the increased loyalty and productivity that such agreements may
inspire." Id. at 681, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
96. See infra notes 211-244 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 163-210 and accompanying text. The Foley majority intimated that a
written employment agreement specifying that the employment relationship is terminable "at-
will" may "preclude enforcement of an implied-in-fact modification" suggesting otherwise.
Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d at 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.23. It is not so
clear that a simple written assertion that employment is at-will will prevent later inconsistent
conduct from creating an implied-in-fact contract claim. Similarly, it is critical to consider
whether oral words of the employer can modify the at-will arrangement notwithstanding a
writing to the contrary. See infra notes 172-199 and accompanying text.
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3. Foley and Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
Unquestionably, the most surprising and far-reaching portion of
the court's lengthy decisiongs is the majority's treatment of thecovenant of good faith and fair dealing. The majority refused torecognize a wrongful termination action based on tortious breach ofthis implied covenant in the employment contract, and thereby greatly
decreased the potential recovery in a wrongful termination action not
based on the violation of public policy.99
The court adhered to the prevailing view 00 that an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is found in every contract in Cali-fornia.'01 The court then repeatedly asserted that the breach of this
implied covenant gives rise solely to an action in contract because
the implied covenant is based on the contract itself, protecting the
express promises of the parties; the implied covenant is not protective
of a generalized public interest arising from the fact that a legally
cognizable interest has been entered into.102 The court thus found
98. The majority's opinion as originally distributed was 72 pages.
99. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.101. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 686, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 (1988).
102. Id. at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232. See id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389,254 Cal. Rptr. at 227 ("The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was developed in thecontract arena and is aimed at making effective the agreement's promises."). The parametersof the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are blurry, at best. See also, Louderback,supra note 55, at 193-95 ("[A]ny attempt to precisely define good faith would unduly restrictits application. Accordingly, the term has been used to exclude heterogeneous forms of badfaith without any precise meaning of their own.... [T]he best method of defining whatconstitutes bad faith is to look at the factual setting of the cases, rather than to attempt toprovide a precise definition of the term."). The majority never fully explained why the impliedcovenant of good faith and fair dealing is so clearly rooted in the law of contract. Indeed,Justice Kaufman bluntly stated that the majority's characterization of the implied covenant asa "contract term" is "simply incorrect under the decisions of this court and the authoritieson which they rely." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 716, 765 P.2d at 413, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 251(Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting). In reaching this conclusion Justice Kaufman largelylooked to the insurance cases that recognize tortious breach. See supra note 55. It does notfollow, however, that breach of the implied covenant should sound in tort in all other contexts.In fact, existing law is clear that the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fairdealing is an action based in contract. See RESTATEmmNT (SEcoND) op CONTRACTS § 205 (1981),which, although referring to the good faith obligation as a "duty," nowhere suggests that tortis the appropriate arena for recovery. See also E.A. FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 37,at § 8.15. Notwithstanding this blind adherence to the well-settled view that the impliedcovenant is a contract-based concept, logic may suggest otherwise. The implied covenant does
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that damages flowing from the breach of the implied covenant should
be limited to contract damages.
10 3
The court reaffirmed that the breach of the implied covenant may
be tortious in the insurance context,10 contending that the confluence
of several factors justified a "major departure" from the general
rule against tort damages for breach of the implied covenant
05 The
majority asserted that a tort recovery for the breach of the implied
covenant in the insurance context is appropriate because: (1) the
insurer-insured relationship is inherently unbalanced; (2) the adhesive
nature of insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior bar-
gaining position; (3) the parties are inherently at odds in their
respective goals; (4) the insured enters the contract for protection
from calamity, not for commercial advantage; and (5) insurers pro-
vide a vital service that is "quasi-public" in nature.i
°i
not truly arise from any promise of the parties. Rather, it reflects 
an external standard of
conduct being imposed on the parties to the contract because society 
has determined that
conduct in good faith is appropriate. As such, the implied covenant 
appears closely aligned
to concepts based in tort. The majority's arguments made to support 
their strong adherence
to a tort cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy 
could be raised in the
context of the implied covenant. See supra note 79. If the implied 
covenant of good faith and
fair dealing reflects "general social policies" (Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668, 
765 P.2d at 378, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 216), rather than promises set out in the contract, it constitutes a "duty"
imposed by law and thus more closely approximates a tort-based 
concept than a concept
arising from the law of contracts. Nonetheless, it is most unlikely 
that courts will soon
transmute the implied covenant into a tort concept in all contexts.
103. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 684, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
The court explained:
"As a contract concept, breach of the duty [of good faith and fair 
dealing] led to imposition
of contract damages determined by the nature of the breach and standard 
contract principles."
Id. at 684, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
104. Id. at 684, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228. ("An exception 
to this general
rule [that the breach of the implied covenant is limited to contract damages] 
has developed in
the context of insurance contracts where, for a variety of policy reasons, 
courts have held that
breach of the implied covenant will provide the basis for an action in tort.")
105. Id. at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
106. Id. at 685, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228. Justice Kaufman 
summarized the
majority's argument as follows:
First, the majority asserts that a breach in the employment context "does 
not place
the employee in the same economic dilemma that the insured faces" 
because the
insured "cannot turn to the marketplace" while the employee presumably 
may "seek
alternative employment." Next, the majority argues that an employer, 
unlike an
insurance company, does not sell economic "protection." The majority 
also rejects
the insurance analogy because an employee, unlike an insured, allegedly 
does not
seek a "different kind of financial security than those entering a typical 
commercial
contract." Finally, the majority asserts that insurance and employment 
contracts
differ "fundamentaily]" because the insured's and insurer's interests are "financially
at odds," while the employer's and the employee's interests allegedly 
are "most
frequently in alignment."
Id. at 718, 765 P.2d at 414, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (Kaufman, J., concurring 
and dissenting)
(citations omitted). Kaufman begins his strong disagreement with the majority's 
analysis by
accusing the majority of "an unrealistic if not mythical conception 
of the employment
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The court then examined the claimed similarity between the em-
ployment context and that of insurance, concluding:
the employment relationship is not sufficiently similar to that of
insurer and insured to warrant judicial extension of the proposed
additional tort remedies in view of the countervailing concerns about
economic policy and stability, the traditional separation of tort and
contract law, and finally the numerous protections against improper
terminations already afforded employees. 17
In reaching this conclusion, the court derided the numerous courts
that had determined that a discharged employee could recover for
relationship." Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting.)
The majority's claim that the insurer and insured are inherently at odds focuses on the time
that the claim is made. The insured receives peace of mind while the insurer receives premiums
and there is no tension between the parties until an occurrence leading the insured to make a
claim. Where a dispute arises about the proper scope of the employment relationship, the
employer and employee are similarly at odds, although they are involved in a symbiotic
relationship up to that point.
107. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234. Notwithstanding its recognition
of existing protections to discharged workers, the court later acknowledged that there is a
notable void in which workers may need additional protections. Id. In his dissent, Justice
Broussard took issue with the majority's determination that the breach of the implied covenant
should be treated differently in the employment context than in the insurance context. He
explained that the key focus should be "whether, as a whole, the contract of employment
more closely resembles an insurance contract or an ordinary commercial contract." Id. at 708,
765 P.2d 407, 254 Cal. Rptr. 245 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). He determined
that the employment context more closely mirrors that of insurance than the usual commercial
contract. Id.
Appellate courts have recognized a cause of action for tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contexts other than employment by analogizing to
the insurance cases. For example, in Commercial Cotton Company, Inc. v. United California
Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985), the appellate court held that a bank
was liable in tort for unreasonably claiming that the depositor-plaintiff's claim against the
bank for paying on several checks without unauthorized signatures was barred by the statute
of limitations. In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the banking relationship to
that of the insurer/insured. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554; see generally Note, Balancing
the Checkbook: Re-allocating Economic Power Between Banks and Depositors, 21 U.C. DAvis
L. Ray. 1275 (1988). In another context, an appellate court determined that the breach of a
pension agreement could lead to tort damages. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d
1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
Notwithstanding its narrow view of tortious breach, the majority adopted the earlier statement
that: "No doubt there are other relationships with similar characteristics [of the insurer/insured
relationship] and deserving of similar legal treatment [as that afforded to breach of insurance
contracts]." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 687, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (citing Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 362 (1984)). Yet, in the Foley opinion, the majority embraced the language of
former Justice Kaus stating that "there are real problems in applying the substitute remedy
of a tort recovery-with or without punitive damages-outside the insurance area. In other
words ... under all the circumstances, the problem is one for the Legislature." Foley, 47
Cal. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 400, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (citing White v. Western Title Ins.
Co., 40 Cal. 3d, 870, 901, 710 P.2d 309, 328, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 528 (1985) (Kaus, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The status of these appellate decisions is thus uncertain in light of
the majority's hostility to a cause of action for tortious breach outside the insurance context.
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tortious breach in certain circumstances, criticizing them for their
"uncritical reliance on insurance law," and their "casual extension"
of California Supreme Court dictum suggesting that an action for
tortious breach would be appropriate. 108 The court berated these
108. Id. at 685, 687, 765 P.2d at 390, 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228, 230. The majority went
to great lengths to assert that the court had never recognized an action for tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context. Id. at 690,
765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232. The majority further claimed that reliance on statements
in Tameny and Seaman's, suggesting the propriety of such an action was misplaced because
the references were "brief" (id. at 687, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230), and "tentative
at best." Id. at 688, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
The court's thoughts about the reasonableness of the reliance on Tameny and Seaman's
were revisited recently in the high court's decision of Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48
Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1989). In Newman, a majority of the
California Supreme Court determined that the Foley decision was to be applied retroactively.
The Foley majority had expressly left unresolved the issue of whether the foreclosure of an
action for the tortious breach of contract in the employment context was to be applied
retroactively. A prospective application of Foley would have precluded tort damages for bad
faith breach only for cases filed after January 30, 1989 (the date the Foley decision became
final). Retroactive application bars such a tort recovery in all actions that were pending in the
courts at the time of the decision. Not surprisingly, the court split on the retroactivity issue
exactly as it split on the issue of tortious breach; the four justices who were in the majority
of Foley were the four votes for retroactivity, and the three Foley dissenters all opposed
retroactive application. Although the issue of retroactivity is not an easy one to resolve in the
Foley context, the author ultimately disagrees with the majority's determination that retroactive
application is appropriate.
The retroactivity issue is not an easy one to resolve in this case. The clear "general rule"
in California is that decisions of the courts are applied retroactively, thereby affecting all
pending, non-final cases. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1221, 753 P.2d 585,
607, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 651 (1988) ("The principle that statutes operate only prospectively,
while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student.") See also
Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 151-52, 642 P.2d 1305, 1308, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784,
787 (1982); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 850, 544 P.2d 561, 568, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 640 (1976); Kreisher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 198 Cal. App. 3d 389, 398, 243 Cal. Rptr. 662,
668 (1988). This presumption of retroactivity arises from a legal system founded on precedent.
Solem v. Stumer, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 399, 690 P.2d
635, 643, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 169-70 (1984), and may arise even where the Supreme Court
overrules its own earlier decision. Mark v. Pacific Gas. & Elec., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 177-78, 496
P.2d 1276, 1280, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912 (1972). Most clearly, when the high court merely
resolves a split among the lower courts, retroactive application is appropriate. Donaldson v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 36-7, 672 P.2d 110, 117-18, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711-12 (1983)
(where a Supreme Court decision resolves "a conflict between lower court decisions there is
'no question' that it should be applied to all pending cases.").
There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule. Where "consideration of fairness and
public policy" militate against retroactivity, the decision may be prospective only. Peterson v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 152, 642 P.2d 1305, 1307, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (1982).
See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 333, 579 P.2d 441, 446-47, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 555-56 (1978); Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 876 (1978); Kreisher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 198 Cal. App. 3d 389, 398, 243
Cal. Rptr. 662, 668 (1988). In measuring these considerations of fairness and public policy,
the reliance of the public upon the former state of the law and the ability of litigants to
foresee the coming change in the law are paramount considerations. Peterson, 31 Cal. 3d at
153, 642 P.2d at 1307-308, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87; Barber v. State Personnel Board, 18 Cal.
3d 395, 400, 556 P.2d 306, 308, 134 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (1976); Kreisher, 198 Cal. App. 3d
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courts nothwithstanding the fact that every appellate court, or federal
court applying California law, that had confronted the issue in the
at 398, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 668. As one court explained: "It is the establishment of a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied
... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed
.*. that poses a question of retroactivity." Schiauch v; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 146
Cal. App. 3d 926, 933 n.6, 194 Cal. Rptr. 658 , 663 n.6 (1983) (citing Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). Where the high court reverses its own precedent, prospective
application may be most appropriate. Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131, 140, 720 P.2d 921,
926, 228 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38 (1986); Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d at 399, 690 P.2d at 643, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 169-70; Donaldson, 35 Cal. 3d at 36-7, 672 P.2d at 117-18, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12 (an
issue regarding retroactive application arises if "the decision established new standards or a
new rule of law."); see generally Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal.
3d 287, 305, 758 P.2d 58, 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 127 (1988) (refusing full retroactive
application of a decision expressly overruling an earlier high court decision creating a new
cause of action, "in the interest of fairness to the substantial number of plaintiffs who have
already initiated their suits in reliance on [prior case law].").
The propriety of the retroactivity of Foley is a thorny issue because the court, unlike in
Moradi-Shalal, did not overrule its own precedent. The court, however, did completely
disassociate itself from its earlier dictum on which appellate courts and litigants had relied.
Notwithstanding the majority's dissatisfaction with the many lower courts that recognized a
tortious breach cause of action (see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text), the issue of
the retroactivity of Foley merited especial consideration because the majority's act of abolishing
an action for tortious breach "makes a 'clear break' from non-Supreme Court law ... [as]
established in the lower courts . . ." Perrello & Golembiewski, Retroactivity of California
Supreme Court Decisions: A Procedural Step Toward Fairness, 17 CAL. WEsT. L. REv. 403,
422 n.116 (1981). Since the Cleary court's recognition of tortious breach in the wrongful
termination context, apparently all California courts having confronted the issue have recog-
nized the cause of action. While there was much confusion and debate about the appropriate
contours of the bad faith action, the lower courts unanimously agreed that such a cause of
action was viable.
Retroactive application of Foley will lead to an onslaught of pretrial motions in the California
courts. Even if a court had earlier denied a defendant's motion for summary judgment, for
example, that party may now make a new summary judgment motion based on the recently
decided law. Pena v. Wolfe, 177 Cal. App. 3d 481, 485, 223 Cal. Rptr. 325, 327-28 (1986).
Further, countless cases have been litigated based on an assumption that a tortious breach
cause of action was available. Based on this concern one court had determined before the
Newman decision, that Foley should be applied prospectively only. See Welch v. Metro-
Goldwyn Film Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 164, 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1988) (as amended January
13, 1989). In Welch, the appellate court determined, in an opinion filed December 23, 1988,
that a jury verdict awarding damages for tortious breach should be upheld. Six days after the
court's decision, Foley was handed down, and the appellate court requested briefing regarding
the possible effect of Foley on its decision. On January 13, 1989, the appellate court filed an
opinion in which the court, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Moradi-Shalal,
explained: "[Tihe interest of fairness to the substantial number of plaintiffs who have already
initiated their suits in reliance on the long-standing case law recognizing a tort cause of action
for bad faith discharge requires that the Foley decision be prospective only." Welch, 207 Cal.
App. 3d at 201, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 666. On the other hand, even if the high court had applied
Foley prospectively only, the lower courts would still have had to grapple with the undefined
contours of the bad faith breach cause of action. The appellate courts, however, were able to
provide the basic framework for analyzing bad faith breach causes of action before Foley,
and would assuredly have been able to resolve the disputes before them. Notwithstanding the
majority's attempt to pretend that reliance on its prior dictum was misplaced and unthinking,
in light of the great reliance litigants and courts had placed on the bad faith breach cause of
action, Foley should have been applied prospectively only.
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last several years believed that a cause of action for tortious breach
of the implied covenant existed in the employment context. 10 9
Three distinct types of contracts merited detailed examination by
the court: commercial contracts, insurance contracts, and employment
contracts. The public policies implicated by each differ, and, accord-
ingly, the appropriate scope of recovery upon breach may differ as
well. The court blurred these critical distinctions by either carelessly
or deliberately failing to consider fully the distinctions between
employment contracts and commercial contracts.1 0 The majority
disingenuously relied on scholarly works that urged great caution
before permitting tort recovery for the breach of a commercial
contract, in an effort to buttress its assertion that tort damages are
impermissible in the context of employment contracts. The majority
deigned to rely on articles that expressly support a tort recovery in
the employment context."' The California Supreme Court itself rather
recently warned against ready extension of tortious breach into the
realm of commercial contracts because of the need for stability and
predictability in that area. 12 The law has long recognized and pro-
tected the right of a party to a commercial contract to breach and
109. In criticizing the lower courts that had assumed that a cause of action for tortious
breach was appropriate in the employment context, the Foley majority derides one of its
colleagues. In 1986, then appellate Justice Kaufman, noted that tortious breach was a viable
cause of action, explaining that: "It appears to be now well established that in appropriate
circumstances an action for 'bad faith' discharge based on the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing will lie in the employment context." Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 1155, 1168, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (1986) (citing Tameny, Seaman's and five
California appellate decisions).
110. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
Il. See, e.g., Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liability-
Is the Remedy for Stonewalling, 21 U.S.F. L. Rav. 419, 475 (1987) (discussing three basic
proposals for extending the tort of bad faith beyond insurance and employment context). See
also Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 713 n.12, 765 P.2d 410-11 n.12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
112. Seaman's v. Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769,
686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984). The Seaman's majority explained:
When we move from such special relationships to consideration of the tort remedy
in the context of the ordinary commercial contract, we move into largely uncharted
and potentially dangerous waters. Here, parties of roughly equal bargaining power
are free to shape the contours of their agreement and to include provisions for
attorney fees and liquidated damages in the event of breach. They may not be
permitted to disclaim the covenant of good faith but they are free, within reasonable
limits at least, to agree upon the standards by which application of the covenant is
to be measured. In such contracts, it may be difficult to distinguish between breach
of the covenant and breach of contract, and there is the risk that interjecting tort
remedies will intrude upon the expectations of the parties. This is not to say that
tort remedies have no place in such a commercial context, but it is wise to proceed
with caution in determining their scope and application.
Id.
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to pay the other party compensatory contract damages.113 Yet, in the
realm of insurance contracts, the court has repeatedly held that
countervailing interests support the recovery of tort damages.
114 At
the very least, employment contracts fall somewhere between insur-
ance contracts and commercial contracts. Thus, the focus should be
whether employment contracts, as such, merit the same protections
afforded insurance contracts, or whether other special protections,
or no special protections, are appropriate. Citation by the majority
to authorities warning against expanded recovery in the commercial
context, however, does not further this inquiry.
After determining the dissimilarity between insurance contracts and
employment contracts, the majority embarked upon a discussion of
whether the court should nonetheless provide additional remedies in
the area of wrongful termination. 15 The court concluded that recov-
ery for the breach of the implied covenant should be limited to
contractual remedies because of the need for predictability to promote
113. As one author explained:
Commercial case law is filled with cases where a contracting party has attempted to
deprive the other party of the benefit of the agreement. When a breach of this kind
occurs, the law provides for a remedy in contract; there is no need for further
damages in tort. Indeed, from an economic standpoint, breaches of contract,
especially where performance of the contract will result in economic waste, are
desirable. On the other hand, when a breach threatens a person's financial security
or peace of mind under circumstances where the plaintiff was not attempting to
exact a profit, then society has a legitimate concern in the transaction.
Louderback, supra note 55, at 222 (footnotes omitted). See also Farnsworth, Legal Remedies
for Breach of Contract, 70 COL. L. Rnv. 1145, 1146-47 (1970). The California Supreme Court
has echoed this sentiment. The Court noted:
Indeed, the assumption that parties may breach at will, risking only contract damages,
is one of the cornerstones of contract law. [I]t is not the policy of the law to compel
adherence to contracts, but only to require each party to choose between performing
in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party for injury resulting
from a failure to perform. This view contains an important economic insight. In
many cases it is uneconomical to induce the completion of the contract after it has
been breached. (Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1972) p. 55.) In most commercial
contracts, recognition of this economic reality leads the parties to accept the possi-
bility of breach, particularly since their right to recover contract damages provides
adequate protection.
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 778, 686 P.2d
1158, 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 369 (1984).
114. See supra note 55.
115. In so doing the majority conceded that the employment contract raises concerns which
are absent in the commercial realm. The court asserted: "The potential effects on an individual
caused by termination of employment arguably justify additional remedies for certain improper
discharges." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 765 P.2d at 346-7, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 234-35 (1988). The court further acknowledged the "widespread perception
that present compensation [to a wrongfully terminated employee] is inadequate." Id. at 696,
765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
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commercial stability, 116 and because of the difficulty in fashioning a
rule that "would assure that only 'deserving' cases give rise to tort
relief. "117
The majority looked at the state of the law of tortious breach in
the employment context and found it to be enormously confused.
Rather than trying to define the parameters of the cause of action,
however, the majority took an easier, though more dramatic step,
and dropped the entire morass into the lap of the legislature."' But
the prior state of confusion in the law was largely due to the lack
of direction from the supreme court that had enabled each lower
court to chart its own course. Under the amorphous state of wrongful
termination law, any termination of an employee created a significant
potential for a wrongful termination lawsuit. The significant expense
of defending unrestricted wrongful termination lawsuits constricts
business' right to make fair and necessary employment decisions
requiring the discharge of employees. Commentators have suggested
116. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
117. Id. at 697, 765 P.2d at 399, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
118. The majority contended that allowing itself to be bound by pure dicta and unfounded
appellate decisions would be inappropriate because the Court would be both "abdicating its
role" and improperly usurping legislative perogative. Id. at 689 n.28, 765 P.2d at 393-94 n.28,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32 n.28. Dumping the issue of remedies for wrongful termination into
the lap of the legislature is viewed by Justice Broussard as judicial abdication. Id. at 712-14,
765 P.2d at 410-12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Further, after decades of the court taking sole responsibility for the creation and definition
of an action for tortious breach in the context of insurance contracts, the sudden concern for
the need for deference to the legislature rings hollow.
At least one commentator urged legislative restraint in the area of wrongful termination so
that the courts would have the opportunity to define clearly the parameters of the legal area:
When faced with uncertainty and contradictory directions in common-law decisions
on a basic and critical issue such as job security, it is tempting to call out for
legislation. In fact, legislation might have been appropriate several years ago when
the common law was not moving, and when indefinite employment was still termi-
nable-at-will. As we hover on the brink of judicial solutions to these important
problems, however, the wiser course of action may be for the legislative bodies to
give the common-law system an opportunity to seek an appropriate solution.
Rohwer, supra note 7, at 780-81. The legislative forum has largely lain dormant while the
courts have been crafting generalized legal protection for wrongfully discharged workers.
Although the legislature has enacted numerous provisions limiting the employer's right to
terminate an employee because the employee engaged in certain activities or possesses a
specified characteristic (see supra note 10), legislative inaction may have resulted from the
legislature's reliance on the courts' activity in the employment area. Further, while business
interests and unions are well organized and are able to apply pressure upon legislators to
provoke legislative action, the non-union worker is not a member of any definite and cohesive
body. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 714, 765 P.2d at 411-12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50 (Broussard,
J. concurring and dissenting) (After this decision, "the burden of seeking legislative change,
which was previously on employers and insurers, two well organized and financed groups, is
now on the unorganized worker.").
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ways to address this legitimate concern." 9 Yet, had the court con-
fronted the hard issues posed by any attempt to define the proper
scope of an action for tortious breach, and had they formulated
standards in the area of bad faith breach, justifiable cases would
still have adequate avenues of redress; frivolous actions or those
lacking much chance of success would either not be filed in light of
the clarified law or would, at the least, be more readily disposed of
early in the litigation process. 120 Nor can the majority assert that
legislative definition of the parameters of wrongful termination causes
of action is the norm. The majority conceded that only one state
has enacted legislation designed to provide at-will employees protec-
tion from arbitrary discharge outside the public policy context.' 2' If
119. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 17, at 405-406 (1987).
120. Some authors clearly expected this needed clarification to come from the court in
their Foley decision. See, e.g., Haggarty, supra note 57, at 464, Haggarty concludes, after
reviewing the confusion among California's appellate courts in their attempt to define the
cause of action for tortious breach, that the high court's clarification of the elements of an
action based on tortious breach will lead to "a more stable area of the law for both practitioners
and the courts alike." Id.
Surely, the majority's course is most unusual. It is highly unlikely that the court will resolve
confusion in other troubled areas of the law by abolishing the cause of action and urging
legislative rebuilding. For example, the California Supreme Court recently rendered the long-
awaited decision of Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1989), which clarified the blurry area of bystander actions for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. It would have been quite remarkable had the court simply eliminated the cause of
action, and suggested to the legislature the reinstatement of the cause of action. The court,
of course, did no such thing and, as is customary, limited their evaluation and resolution to
the dispute before them. Admittedly, the analogy is not perfect. The California Supreme Court
itself had expressly created and continued to refine the cause of action for bystander negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d
1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968). Nonetheless, on at least two occasions high court dictum had suggested the validity of
an action for tortious breach in the employment context. See supra note 50. Further, there is
nothing remarkable about the court reconstruing a statute of long-standing. For example, in
Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the court rejected
the argument that Civil Code section 1714, enacted in 1872, could only be altered by the
legislature. In reinterpreting the statute to permit the court to adopt comparative fault, the
court explained that:
it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil
Code, as well as other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to
insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial development; rather it
was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing common
law principles and definitions for purposes of orderly and concise presentation and
with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution.
Id. at 814, 532 P.2d at 1233, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
Justice Kaufman provides an elegant rebuttal to the Foley majority's determination that the
legislative arena is the appropriate forum for determining the appropriate remedies for a
terminated employee. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 719-721, 765 P.2d 415-17, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 253-55 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 695 n.31, 765 P.2d at 397-98 n.31, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36
n.31. Montana's legislative action followed judicial action affording broad protection to
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the legislature is to act in this area, it must outline when a tort
recovery is appropriate by explaining what more than breach of an
implied-in-fact contract is needed to state a cause of action. Cases
where the employer does nothing more than breach a term of a
contract should not be transformed into tort actions; there must be
some additional conduct evidencing bad faith in the employer's
conduct to bring to bear damages sounding in tort. To this end,
legislative consideration of Hefmadi, Koehrer and Khanna may prove
helpful.122
In essence, the Foley court throws the "baby out with the bath-
water"; not finding satisfactory parameters for an action for tortious
breach, the court simply obliterates the cause of action.12
wrongfully terminated at-will workers. See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d
1015 (Mont. 1984).
122. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1988); Koehrer
v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata
Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985). See generally Summers, Individual
Protections Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
123. The California Legislature may have begun to heed the court's plea for legislative
assistance, however. Several bills have been introduced in the legislature that will have varying
degrees of impact on California employment law. But legislative action will not prove the
panacea believed by the majority if there is no clear delineation of the remedies to be afforded
wrongfully discharged workers. For example, within weeks of the Foley decision, Senator
Torres introduced legislation (S.B. 181) designed to overrule Foley's holding regarding tortious
breach. The text of the bill, as introduced, provides: "An employee may bring an action in
tort against an employer for bad faith discharge of the employee if the employer breaches an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the employee." S.B. 181, 1988-89 Cal.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 12, 1989). While this may be some indication that the legislature will
get more involved in the employment arena, the bill itself is problematic. The bill simply states
an intention to overrule Foley so far as it limits tort damages for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It offers no guidance about the parameters of the
tort-based action, throwing the problem back to the courts where the confusion originated. In
light of Foley, the legislature should specify the appropriate contours of the tortious breach
cause of action.
Two other legislative efforts to alter California employment law merit mention. Assembly
Member Murray and Senator B. Greene have introduced legislation (A.B. 386, 1988-89 Cal.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 30, 1989), and S.B. 324, 1988-89 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 31, 1989))
that would repeal the longstanding "at will" provisions of California Labor Code section
2922, and would limit employers of more than four employees to terminations for "just cause"
in most situations. The bills provide nine broad categories of "just cause" and also provide
procedures for termination and for mediation and arbitration. Id. Enactment of this legislation
would mark a dramatic alteration of existing employment law.
A complete restructuring of current wrongful termination law would follow from the adoption
of another highly-detailed bill. Senator Beverly has introduced legislation designed to preempt
most of the area of wrongful termination. His bill, S.B. 222, 1988-89 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 19, 1989), retains the general proposition of at-will employment but delineates various
specific exceptions to the at-will provision. As an example, the bill would permit an exception
when a court finds that the employer's discharge of the employee occurred without a good-
faith belief by the employer that good cause existed to justify the termination, the employee
had worked for the employer for at least 1,000 hours per year for five or more consecutive
years, and the plaintiff, at the time of discharge, was receiving total remuneration of less than
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III. THE PosT-Foley State of the Law
With the stroke of the pen, the Foley majority blockaded the
central avenue to tort recovery for a wrongfully terminated worker.
After Foley, only two of the former common-law bases for recovery
for wrongful termination exist: a contract action based on express
and implied promises by the employer, and an ill-defined tort action
for terminations contrary to public policy. The majority forecloses
any tort-based recovery arising from the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court's opinion also
suggests an unwillingness to permit a contract-based action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by a purely
at-will employee.24 Further, the independent significance and vitality
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in the context
of an employee able to assert an implied-in-fact promise that the
employer will terminate only for "just cause," is uncertain. 1'
At the same time, the court enthusiastically embraces contract law
as the panacea for the ills of most wrongfully terminated employees.
A modernized and flexible approach to contract law, seemingly
welcomed by the majority,'u may inject greater stability into the
wrongful termination realm, while ensuring that wrongfully termi-
nated employees are justly compensated. If, however, rigid and
antiquated contract principles are applied, allowing employers to
undercut the protections afforded employees by the majority's ad-
herence to Pugh, the wrongfully terminated employees of California
are left with little legal protection.
A. Evaluating "Public Policy" After Foley
The Foley court posited a new focus for determining when a
discharge is violative of public policy, directing the focus toward an
evaluation of whether the asserted policy is "substantial," "funda-
mental," and, most critically, "public" enough to underlie the cause
$ 100,000. Id. Under the bill, the burden of proof on each issue is on the plaintiff-employee.
Id. The bill also affords limited protection to a narrow category of wrongfully terminated
workers and includes mandatory mediation provisions. Id.
124. See infra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 154-162 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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of action. Yet, the court failed to offer direction or guidance to the
lower courts that will now have to struggle to effectuate the court's
ambiguous standard. The evaluation of whether an asserted interest
is "public" is quite challenging, particularly in view of the court's
surprising determination that Foley's claim failed to assert a public
policy. While Foley's asserted interest in reporting relevant infor-
mation about co-workers to management on its face reflects no clear
public interest, a slightly different characterization of that same
interest-asserting an interest to warn potential victims of crime
about possible imminent danger so as to aid crime prevention-
cannot so readily be discarded as outside the "public interest."' 127
The court's narrow interpretation of Foley's asserted public policy
basis places Foley and those situated similarly to him in an untenable
position. As an agent, an employee has a fiduciary duty of diligent
and faithful service to his principal. 28 Implicit in the agent-employee's
fiduciary duty is the obligation to "use reasonable efforts to give his
principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him,
and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to
127. Justice Mosk, in his dissent, contended that plaintiffs conduct implicates a public
interest. Justice Mosk described Foley's conduct as "advising a state-created corporation of
the employ in a supervisoria position of a person chargeable with a potential felony ... "
Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 724, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Perhaps Foley's own characterization of his motive for informing his supervisor about Kuhne's
criminal record proved to be his undoing. Foley asserted that he informed his superior about
the investigation of Kuhne because "he believed that because defendant and its parent do
business with the financial community on a confidential basis, the company would have a
legitimate interest in knowing about a high executive's alleged prior criminal conduct." Id. at
664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213. So designated, the public interest aspect of crime
reporting is minimized.
Although not discussed by the court, perhaps a countervailing public policy would prevent
any recognition of Foley's public policy claim. California law expressly prohibits an employer
from considering arrests that did not result in conviction "in determining any condition of
employment including ... termination." CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1989). Thus,
an employer may not discharge an employee on the basis of an arrest not leading to a
conviction. As one court explained: "The obvious intent of the legislation is to prevent the
adverse impact on employment opportunities of information concerning arrests where culpability
cannot be proved." Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1044, 243 Cal. Rptr.
306, 309-10 (1988). In Foley, Kuhne had not even been arrested at the time of Foley's
termination, and a public policy protecting a person from termination absent conviction would,
arguably, have been even stronger. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 213 (Kuhne was only under investigation at the time of Foley's discharge). This
argument is ultimately not particularly compelling in Foley, however. It is clear that the
purpose of the section is not "to shelter an employee from investigation for serious misconduct"
and, accordingly, is inapposite where, as in Foley, the arrest leads to a conviction. See Pitman,
197 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
128. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2854 (West Supp. 1989). Section 2854 provides: "One who,
for a good consideration, agrees to serve another, shall perform the service, and shall use
ordinary care and diligence therein, so long as he is thus employed." Id.
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know... ."129 Thus, Foley would have breached his fiduciary duty
to his employer had he failed to report that Kuhne was a suspected
embezzler, thereby placing his job in jeopardy and opening himself
up to potential liability. By complying with his fiduciary obligation,
Foley ultimately placed his job in jeopardy nonetheless. If there is a
duty imposed upon an agent-employee to disclose relevant informa-
tion to the principal-employer, it is ludicrous to allow the principal-
employer to terminate the agent-employee for complying with the
fiduciary obligation. The public policy of the state seeks to encourage
agents to report such information to their principals; allowing prin-
cipals to terminate agents for acting in a manner consistent with this
public policy cannot be condoned as it directly undermines that
public policy.
Further, even if a wrongful termination action is not compelling
in this instance, the suggested focus of the court is troubling. The
court intimated that one way to gauge the public interest is to discern
whether an agreement between the employer and the employee that
requires the employee not to act in accordance with the alleged public
interest would be enforceable. 130 This "test" is unworkable because
the goals of the law of contract differ greatly from the alms of tort
law. While contract law seeks to enforce the promises of the parties,
tort law focuses on society's requirements and sets certain minimal
standards of conduct regardless of, and possibly in spite of, any
agreement by the parties.' 3' The strong presumption favoring the
enforceability of contracts 32 has little vitality in the realm of employer
conduct in violation of public policy, conduct conceded to give rise
129. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, § 381 (1958). See B. WrrarN, SUMMARY oF
CA r noRN LAW, AGENcY AND PARTNERSmp, § 41 (1987) ("An agent is a fiduciary. His
obligation of diligent and faithful service is the same as that of a trustee.... Thus, an agent
is required to disclose to the principal all information that he has relevant to the subject
matter of the agency.") See also Chodur v. Edmonds, 174 Cal. App. 3d 565, 572, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 80, 84 (1985) ("An agent as fiduciary is required to disclose to his principal all information
he has relevant to the subject matter of the agency."); Orfanos v. California Ins. Co., 29
Cal. App. 2d 75, 80, 84 P.2d 233, 235 (1938) ("It is too well settled to need citation of
authority that an agent must disclose to its principal all facts within its knowledge pertaining
to the agency.")
130. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 670 n.11, 765 P.2d at 380 n.11, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.1l.
131. See W. KEETON, D. DOBaS, R. KETON & D.OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 92 (5th ed. 1984).
132. See Moran v. Harris, 131 Cal. App. 3d 913, 919, 182 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522 (1982)
(quoting Stephens v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 89-90, 41 P. 783 (1895)) ("While
contracts opposed to morality or law should not be allowed to show themselves in courts of
justice, yet public policy requires and encourages the making of contracts by competent parties
upon all valid and lawful considerations, and courts so recognizing have allowed parties the
widest latitude in this regard ... ").
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to an action sounding in tort. Most critically, the role of "public
policy" in contract differs from its role in tort. 33  The majority's
"test" is underinclusive because it permits an employer to discharge
an employee for acting in a manner beneficial to a public interest
not reflected by statute. 114 For example, would Foley have stated a
cause of action if he had heard from a reliable source that his
immediate supervisor had been stealing equipment from the work-
place and Foley had reported this to his employer, thereby creating
a closer nexus between the alleged criminal conduct and the employ-
er's interest? Would a different answer follow if Foley had actually
seen his supervisor steal equipment from the workplace and had
reported this to his employer, thereby minimizing the role of innu-
endo? 3s Would (and should) the result differ if Foley contacted the
police rather than his employer? Does (and should) the answer to
this depend upon the existence of a statute requiring the reporting
of a crime? 36 Finally, would a different conclusion be reached if the
133. LOUDERBACK & JuRwInA, supra note 55, at 191 ("Public policy plays a major role
in determining what particular acts will constitute a tort. By contrast, it is rare when public
policy considerations are utilized to interfere with the obligations negotiated by the contracting
parties.").
134. Another reason that the proposed test is faulty is because it fails to adequately deter
the improper conduct of an employer. Under the majority's analysis of public policy, would
there be any tort action possible against an employer who terminates an employee days before
that employee was to receive accrued commissions? Cf. Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). Under Foley, there is no "wrongful termination"
action possible absent finding an implied-in-fact contract term limiting the employer to
termination for cause outside of the public policy arena. See supra notes 141-148 and
accompanying text. If no public policy is implicated, the employee would be limited to the
administrative remedies under which the employee may make a claim for wages owed. See
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96.7, 98, 98.6, 98.7, 206 (West Supp. 1989). Under the Labor Code,
recoverable damages are generally significantly less than under the common law cause of
action. Through this procedure the employee generally can only get little more than that which
was already owed to him or her in the first place, and, thus, the statutory provisions have
less of a deterrent effect on an employer than would the tort cause of action. Where the
employee is terminated before certain benefits accrue, such as a right to profit sharing, there
may not even be statutory protection for the employee.
135. Under the court's reasoning, the first example remains purely a "private" matter
between the employee and the employer. The second example may lead to a contrary result
because it directly involves the reporting of actual criminal conduct which conceivably implicates
a clearer public interest. On the other hand, under the majority's analysis private crime
reporting may arguably never raise a sufficient public interest.
136. California law expressly prohibits retaliation against an employee for reporting sus-
pected crime to the police and would render a discharge for reporting suspected crimes clearly
violative of public policy. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West Supp. 1989) which specifically
prohibits retaliation against an employee for reporting suspected criminal conduct to the police.
Per Foley, firing the employee for his or her act of reporting the identical conduct to the
appropriate supervisor does not violate public policy. See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 723-24, 765 P.2d 373, 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 256 (1988) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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supervisor was alleged to be stealing from customers, rather than the
employer? Would this then implicate a substantial public interest?
137
While the impossibility of proclaiming a bright-line definition of
"public policy" is regrettable, it is not possible to defer entirely to
the legislature in this area. 138 Legislative efforts to define "public
policy" have been largely reactive-a problem arises and ultimately
legislation is enacted as a specific response. 39 It is not possible for
the legislature to delineate all of the potential public policy grounds
that may arise in the wrongful termination context. Nor, as Foley
indicates, is the existence of a statutory handle necessarily a logical
basis for the assertion of the tort cause of action. Courts should be
permitted to sanction employer conduct that is clearly in contraven-
tion of public policy.' 4°
137. Unlike Tameny and Petermann, who asserted that they were terminated because they
refused to perform acts violative of public policy, Foley claimed that he was discharged because
he performed an act favored by public policy. Provided that a substantial public policy is
implicated, both situations can logically underlie the cause of action. There is judicial support
for a public policy favoring protection of employees against retaliatory termination for
expressing "concerns, within an enterprise, concerning the legality or morality of enterprise
conduct." Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324 n.14, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924
(1981).
138. Those who seek to limit the public policy exception to statutory enactments claim
that a more amorphous standard will lead to unbridled discretion by the courts, enabling them
to decree public policies from the bench, without affording the employer advance notice of
what conduct could lead to civil litigation. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 179-80. While it
is true that the pronouncement of public policy is usually a leislative function, California law
has long held that "when neither the Constitution nor the Legislature has spoken on the
subject the courts may make the declaration." Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks, 41 Cal. 2d
567, 574, 261 P.2d 721, 725 (1953). Further, the limitation by the Foley court, to "significant"
or "fundamental" public policies, reduces the risk of lack of notice to an employer because
the asserted policy will be one about "which reasonable persons can have little disagreement,
[the policy] being 'firmly established' at the time of discharge." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668, 765
P.2d at 378, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
139. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 450 (West Supp. 1989) (prohibiting discharge for an
employee's refusal to patronize employer.)
140. Where an employee asserts that he or she has been terminated in violation of some
public interest that is compelling and important, California courts should be able to vindicate
the employee's right even in the absence of a statutory basis. In many cases, the plaintiff will
seek to assert a statutory basis for the action because, particularly in light of Foley, a statute-
based claim will greatly aid the plaintiff in his or her efforts to persuade the court of the
merits of the cause of action. A statutory basis for the claim of public policy will usually be
quite helpful as it will reflect both the fact that the policy is so substantial and fundamental
that legislative or administrative action was taken, and that there is a "public" interest at
issue. Courts will therefore look to existing statutes and regulations for guidance in this area.
While no definition of public policy, broad enough to encompass all meritorious situations
and narrow enough to be of value, can be crafted, legislative and judicial action will ultimately
define the contours of the cause of action. Further, in addition to having to persuade the
judge that the employee's termination was in contravention of a substantial public policy
worthy of judicial recognition, the discharged employee will have to prove the claim. Despite
the facial validity of the claim, the factual record may be lacking. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's
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After Foley, it appears that the key focus turns away from the
existence or non-existence of a statutory basis for the "public policy"
and toward a determination of whether the public policy is funda-
mental and substantial, and, most importantly, whether it truly
reflects an interest of the public, as opposed to a purely private
matter. How this will be decided remains to be seen.
B. The Purely At- Will Employee141
A purely at-will employee is unable to rebut the presumption of
California Labor Code section 2922 that employment for an unspe-
cified duration is terminable at will. In light of the language of this
section, it is unlikely that a purely-at-will employee can challenge
termination on any non-statutory ground other than the public policy-
based cause of action. Yet, arguably there exists some level of
employer conduct in the context of an employee discharge that is so
arbitrary that the terminated employee should be able to receive at
least contract damages.
In California, an at-will employment agreement constitutes a con-
tract. 42 Like any contract in California, the at-will employment
contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 143 Seemingly, that implied covenant should restrict certain con-
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322-24, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922-24 (1981) (despite facial
validity of Pugh's public policy claim that he was terminated for his refusal to participate in
negotiations for an illegal union contract, trial court correctly found insufficient evidence for
jury consideration of the claim).
141. By this the author refers to those employees who are unable to satisfy the Pugh
criteria for an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate absent cause.
142. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 676, 765 P.2d 373, 384, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 222 (1988). Typically the employment agreement is silent as to the term of
employment. Where there is no express term as to duration of the employment relationship,
courts invariably imply a term that the contract is terminable at will. E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 37 § 7.17. California courts, in so doing, act consistently with the presumption of
at-will employment created by Labor Code section 2922 See supra note 33.
143. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
California adheres to the general rule that the covenant is implied in every contract. See,
e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d
1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1655 (West 1985).
See generally REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). "Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
The Restatement rule is based upon the Uniform Commercial Code section 1-203, which
provides that, "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (West 1987). Courts frequently imply terms
requiring the parties to act with good faith. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. Rv. 666,
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duct that is not in "good faith" in the employment context.
144
Nevertheless, the court's decision clearly renders the implied covenant
utterly impotent in cases of termination of a purely at-will employee.
By holding that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing found
in the at-will employment relationship can never be breached by the
employer's termination of an at-will employee, the court bars a
plaintiff's right to legal redress even in cases of arbitrary or malev-
olent discharge. 45 The following arguments constitute the "logic"
behind this result. Because termination at will is part of the employ-
ment agreement, the employer's act of terminating an employee at
will is generally not viewed as actionable. Absent a public policy
violation, the employee may neither assert an action for breach of
contract, because at-will termination is not a breach, nor a tort or
contract action for breach of the implied covenant, because the
implied covenant only protects the parties' rights to receive the benefit
667-68 (1963). See also Louderback, supra note 55, at 190 ("The concept of good faith and
fair dealing pervades many areas of contract law," noting the Uniform Sales Act, the Robinson-
Patman Act and the Bankruptcy Act, in addition to the U.C.C.).
144. Although the parameters of the obligation are ill defined, some courts found that
there was some minimum level of good faith required of employers, even in the at-will
employment context. Falling below this minimal level subjects the employer to liability. As
one judge explained: "California courts have properly decided that there does exist some point
at which they should intervene to prevent unfair treatment of individual employees by their
employers. The cases have long since settled this basic question." Cox v. Resilient Flooring
Div. of Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (applying California law).
In Cox, Judge Letts, after giving a narrow interpretation to California wrongful termination
law, asserted that there is a fundamental obligation arising from the implied covenant that the
employer treat an employee "fairly in the overall." Id. at 737. Judge Letts then concluded
that the "very narrow rule" he advocated requires, per the implied covenant, that "the
employer return the terminated employee to the marketplace 'whole,' and free of the detriment
necessarily incident to the termination of the employment relation." Id. at 738. The court
continued:
As to this, it seems appropriate to consider again the fact that by choosing a
particular employment an employee ordinarily gives up the right to consider other
employment freely and without loss of income. With this in mind it seems proper
to suggest that "fair" treatment ordinarily requires that the employer provide the
employee with severance which is adequate to provide him a reasonable chance of
finding colorable employment without loss of income and that the employer maintain
an official posture with respect to the termination which does not unfairly prejudice
the employee's future employment prospects.
Id. at 738.
145. If an employer wakes one day and decides to fire a certain redheaded employee
because the employer has suddenly developed an anthipathy for red hair, or due to an irritable
mood opts to discharge every fourth employee as he or she arrives for work, under Foley
there would be no cause of action-neither contract nor tort-unless an implied-in-fact contract
limiting termination to just cause had been formed. The employer may, thus, act arbitrarily,
at least until the point where the employer's conduct can be deemed to be in contravention
of public policy. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Of course, an employer's
arbitrary termination of an at-will employee becomes actionable if it constitutes an independent
tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation.
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of their agreement, which encompasses the right of termination at
will. The Foley majority explained: "[W]ith regard to an at-will
employment relationship, breach of the implied covenant cannot
logically be based on a claim that a discharge was made without
good cause. If such an interpretation applied, then all at-will contracts
would be transmuted into contracts requiring good cause for termi-
nation.. .. "14 Or, put another way, because the at-will doctrine
permits termination without just cause, the discharged employee is
prevented from any recovery for arbitrary, even malicious, discharge.
The decision not only forecloses an action for tortious breach in this
context 47 but prohibits an at-will employee's contract-based action
146. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 698 n.39, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238 n.39.
Interestingly, Justices Kaufman and Broussard may also have adhered to the majority's
restrictive view. Justice Kaufman asserted that "[c]learly, no action for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing will lie unless it has first been proved that, expressly or by
implication, the employer has given the employee a reasonable expectation of continued
employment so long as the employee performs satisfactorily." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 719, 765
P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in
original). Justice Kaufman's statement, however, is in the midst of his advocacy for the
recognition of a tort action for breach of the implied covenant, and may, accordingly, suggest
that a Pugh action must be a prerequisite for an action for tortious breach. Indeed, this
interpretation is consistent with Justice Kaufman's position in Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181
Cal. App. 3d, 1155, 1171, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829 (1986). Justice Broussard asserts that "[a]
tort action for bad faith discharge also requires that the discharge be wrongful-that is, breach
of contract." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 710-11, 765 P.2d at 409, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
147. In limited situations prior to Foley, a recovery in tort for terminating a purely at-will
employee was permitted. See, e.g., Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d. 250, 215
Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985). In Khanna, the court found defendant's bad faith, extraneous to the
contract of employment, motivated by an intent to frustrate the plaintiff's enjoyment of his
employment rights, to constitute tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Id. at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The defendant allegedly fired the plaintiff for
bringing a legal action against the employer and for the purpose of forcing the plaintiff to
forego accrued commissions. Id. at 257, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The Khanna rationale was
followed recently in Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1988).
The Heimadi court, though generally refusing to permit a tortious breach action by a purely
at-will employee, acknowledged the validity of the Khanna test, noting:
Thus, the lesson of Khanna is that the implied covenant tort remedy may be applied
to an at-will employment termination case under certain limited circumstances. The
elements giving rise to the cause of action are these: (1) the employees have some
specific expectation of benefit from the employment contract; (2) the expectation of
benefit is not dependent upon a continuous employment relationship which can only
be terminated for good cause [because the employee would no longer be at-will in
that case]; and (3) bad faith termination coupled with the wrongful intent to deprive
the employee of the specialized benefit of the agreement.
Both contractual and policy considerations join to justify imposing an implied
covenant tort remedy in an at-will employment termination case where there is a
convergence of the elements we have defined. There exists a bargained for contractual
benefit which the employee has reason to expect will be observed by the employer,
in good faith. There is also an offense against 'accepted notions of business ethics,
where the employer in bad faith and with the wrongful intent to deprive the employee
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for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
as well. 148
The Foley court correctly expresses concern that permitting even a
contract action by a purely at-will employee based on the employee's
claim that he or she was terminated without good cause will wholly
eviscerate the statutory dictates of section 2922 of the California
Labor Code. A more moderate approach can be fashioned by placing
limited constraints on the employer's otherwise unfettered rights to
terminate, while still leaving the purely at-will employee much more
vulnerable to discharge than an employee able to assert he or she is
terminable only for good cause. Where an employee asserts an implied
promise that he or she is not terminable absent just cause, a jury
finding that the employer acted in "good faith" and "nonarbitrarily"
is not enough for the employer to escape liability; the defendant is
exonerated only upon a jury finding of just cause for the termina-
tion. 149 For a purely at-will employee, however, the implied covenant
could provide a contract remedy only when the employer acts arbi-
trarily and unreasonably.150 This limitation serves to protect the
employer who is acting in good faith.
of that contractual benefit terminates the relationship. Such conduct transcends a
mere breach of contract and warrants a remedy sounding in tort.
Id. at 552, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (citations omitted).
Though the asserted standards are quite vague, the Khanna court and the Hejmadi court
recognized that in limited situations a tort action was needed to deter an employer's potential
"bad faith" conduct.
148. Other undefined conduct not leading to termination may lead to contractual liability
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing even in the context of a
purely at-will contract. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 698 n.39, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 238 n.39. Exactly what conduct would give rise to a breach is uncertain, but would
perhaps, for example, consist of employer actions that impede the purely at-will employee's
effort to make sales thereby reducing the employee's commissions, or instances where the
employee has been demoted or refused a promotion in bad faith.
149. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 768, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212
(1988). The Pugh II court, relying heavily on Toussaint v. Blue Cross, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980), held that in an employee's breach of contract action, in which the employee
asserts he or she is terminable only for just cause, the jury's appropriate focus is on whether
the employer's asserted basis for discharge amounts to good cause and not whether the jury
finds the employer's decision to terminate was reasonable. Id.
150. One court, construing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to apply
generally to the employment context, noted:
Under the common law rule codified in Labor Code section 2922, an employment
contract of indefinite duration is, in general, terminable at 'the will' of either party.
This common law rule has been considerably altered by the recognition of the
Supreme Court of California that implicit in any such relationship or contract is an
underlying principle that requires the parties to deal openly and fairly with one
another. [citations omitted] This general requirement of fairness has been identified
as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [citation omitted] The covenant of
good faith and fair dealing embraces a number of rights, obligations, and consid-
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Ultimately, a re-evaluation of section 2922 may be in order by the
legislature which should balance the need for stability in the business
sphere, which necessarily includes broad employer discretion in em-
ployment decisions, with limitations on the employer's right to re-
move a person from employment in a wholly arbitrary manner.'
C. The Employee Asserting an Implied-in-Fact Promise
While the court's route to the conclusion that the implied covenant
will not lead to tort damages in the purely at-will employment
relationship is understandable, the same result in the context of an
implied-in-fact contract does not follow. Where the Pugh criteria are
met and an implied-in-fact contract is deemed to exist under which
the employee may be terminated only for "good cause," other
considerations arise. Liability for breach of contract is strict; the
motive or mental state of the party in breach is irrelevant for purposes
of contract analysis. 52 The majority's determination that there cannot
be a tort recovery arising from the breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that is found in the implied-in-fact
contract greatly reduces the effect of pre-Foley law in deterring
employers from asserting a pretextual basis for the discharge. In
cases where the employer is bound to an implied-in-fact promise not
erations implicit in contractual relations and certain other relationships. At least two
of those considerations are relevant here. The duty of fair dealing by an employer
is, simply stated, a requirement that like cases be treated alike. Implied in this, of
course, is that the company, if it has rules and regulations, apply those rules and
regulations to its employees as well as affording its employees their protection....
IT]he fair dealing portion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is at
least the right of an employee to the benefit of rules and regulations adopted for
his or her protection.
Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach's. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524, 529 (1984). while the Foley majority decision is largely at odds with the Rulon-
Miller case, rendering Rulon-Miller of questionable authority, some of the Rulon-Miller court's
logic remains compelling. Possibly a contract action could lie for the breach of the implied
covenant where it is not the fact of discharge that is being challenged, but rather the employer's
arbitrary failure to follow its own procedures is the basis of the action.
151. The legislature may have begun to reassess the merits of the at-will provision. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text. One author suggests that the appropriate focus should
turn from statutory efforts to restrict California Labor Code section 2922, to the California
Constitution. Comment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9, at 382-86 (asserting that
sections 7(a) and 8 of Article I of the California Constitution, prohibiting unequal protection
of the laws and discrimination respectively, should be employed by the California courts to
mandate just cause for all terminations).
152. E.A. FARNswoRiH, supra note 9, § 12.8 ("[C]ontract law is, common in its essential
design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying system of remedies operates without
regard to fault.")
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to terminate absent cause, the employer will be liable for breach of
contract if the jury finds that the employer lacked just cause for the
discharge. By asserting a wholly pretextual basis for discharge, the
employer either will persuade the jury based on the pretextual basis
that there was just cause, or will be liable for the same measure of
contract damages that are due from the breach of the implied promise
in the first place. Where an employer terminates such an employee
without good cause, that employee may sue for breach of contract
and recover appropriate contract damages. It matters not that the
actor has acted with malice, spite, or vengeance, on the one hand,
and innocently, but erroneously, on the other. By foreclosing possible
tort recovery in those situations where the employer seeks to terminate
an employee for a wholly improper motive, not amounting to a
violation of public policy, there is little deterrent factor or sanction
under the court's formulation.
15 3
D. The Independent Significance of the Implied Covenant
The exact scope or function of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is uncertain. 154 California courts have repeatedly
asserted that the covenant is implied in every contract. 55 The apparent
function of the implied covenant is to ensure that "neither party will
do anything which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits
of the agreement.' ' 56 Before the implied covenant was viewed as a
potential basis for an action in tort, however, it really added little
153. At some point, the employer places himself or herself at risk of commifting inde-
pendent torts such as defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g.,
Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 524. The Rulon-Miller court permitted
the plaintiff to recover contract damages for wrongful termination based on breach of an
implied contract and tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The court also upheld the plaintiffs right to recover for the independent tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, including punitive damages. The court acknowledged
the high threshold of proof required, explaining: "The general rule is that this tort, in essence,
requires the defendant's conduct to be so outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id. at
254, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 533. The court determined that this standard was met where the
employer, violating its own policies designed to protect an employee's right to privacy,
terminated the plaintiff because she was romantically involved with a former-IBM employee
who now worked for a competitor, yet asserted a pretextual basis for discharge. Id. at 254-
55, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
154. See supra note 102.
155. See supra note 143.
156. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; Commercial
Union Assurance Co's. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041,
164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980).
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to contract analysis. Often vague references to the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing meant nothing more than there was
a breach of an implied promise, leading appropriately to an action
for breach of contract.157
The majority opinion forecloses a tort action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing even for an employee
who successfully asserts an implied-in-fact promise to terminate only
for just cause.' Nevertheless, the implied covenant may require a
minimum level of fairness in this context. A jury might determine
that, although the employer's policies do not provide for pre-termi-
nation warning and a probationary period, the implied covenant does
require such a level of fairness and decency. This argument does not
seem foreclosed by Foley. Limited to its original contract status, does
the implied covenant have any independent significance in the im-
plied-in-fact context?'59 Can the implied covenant independently un-
derlie a breach of contract action in the wrongful termination context
after Foley? Where an employer has termination guidelines and
policies, may an employee assert that the conduct of the employer
is inconsistent with these policies, thereby violating the implied cov-
enant? 60
There may be instances in which a plaintiff may state a Pugh
cause of action, but at trial the employer demonstrates that it
157. See Rohwer, supra note 7, at 770-72. Outside the context of tortious breach, reference
to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is used in an "off-hand, nontechnical
fashion" as "a basis for finding or construing other contract terms." Id. at 772 n.72.
158. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 239 (1988).
159. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is found in an implied-in-fact
contract, as well as an express contract. The implied covenant is implied in all contracts and
an implied-in-fact contract is as "real" a contract as an express one. See supra note 37.
160. See Van Komen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 638 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
Van Komen, the plaintiff, terminated for poor job performance after not meeting objectives
set for him by the employer during two probationary periods pursuant to the employer's
procedures, unsuccessfully asserted that the employer "had a long term practice of placing
long-term employees in another position in lieu of termination." Id. at 741. The court warned
against judicial intervention in this area, noting that: "Courts are ill-equipped to judge whether
disciplinary policies ... are the result of corporate good citizenship or merely a reflection of
the advice of those in the 'disemployment industry' . . . whose raison d'etre is to clothe in a
legally-defensible fabric every decision to terminate." Id. The judge warned against punishing
"the leaders for developing clear policies for dealing with employees whose performance is
poor." Id. at 741-42.
A related issue arises if all of an employer's personnel policies and statements become
construed as binding contractual obligations. If the employer's deviation for any aspect of its
policies-the employer's termination procedures-can lead to contractual liablilty, employees
will be worse off because an incentive will be created for employers to avoid any specificity
in their procedures. Ultimately, a discharged employee, claiming to have relied on the employer's
policies, will be limited to aspects that are deemed "material."
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substantially complied with its policies. May a plaintiff still prevail
under an argument that even if the employer did not breach any
promise created by its policies, the employer's policies were funda-
mentally unfair, and thus the employer's action breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing? 161 The court did not suggest any
weakening of the implied covenant in the contract context where the
employee asserts a Pugh claim. Accordingly, a jury may find an
employer's breach of contract based on the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 62 Recovery, however, would
be limited to damages recoverable in a contract-based action.
E. Oral Modification of Employment Contracts and Disclaimers
-Can Employers Evade Foley's Protections?
The Foley court directs most wrongfully discharged employees to
look to the law of contracts, not to the law of torts, as the appropriate
arena of legal protection. Yet, if an employer can "opt out" of
liability through written employment contracts or disclaimers included
in the employer's personnel policies, asserting rigid and outmoded
notions of the law of contract, the court's adherence to contract
principles is a Pyrrhic victory for employees indeed. 63
The Foley majority determined that Foley stated a claim for breach
of an implied-in-fact contract for employment terminable only for
just cause by alleging "that a course of conduct, including various
oral representations, created a reasonable expectation to that ef-
161. But if a contract action can be based on the breach of the implied covenant in this
context, is it logical for it to be foreclosed in the context of the truly at-will employee? See
supra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
162. The implied covenant may have special importance in the context of the employer
and employee who are in a fiduciary relationship. See supra note 128. At one point the Foley
court acknowledged that "[t]he obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities
of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at
685, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. 228 (citing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.
3d 804, 820, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1974)) (emphasis added). The Court
made this reference in the context of insurance contracts, but the employer-employee relation-
ship is also a relationship of trust. Accordingly, the implied covenant's concern for "decency
and humanity" may have independent vitality in the realm of employment relationships, though
its breach would not give rise to tort damages.
163. See generally Rohwer, supra note 7, at 782. Professor Rohwer explains, in advocating
the law of contract as "the sole remedy in the garden variety discharge case": "Contract law
need not be revolutionized to make it compatible with the perceived needs of employees, but
courts must embrace some new or relatively new contract law that has already found its way
into cases." Id. The Foley court clearly embraces a more flexible and liberalized contract
law-finding neither a statute of frauds hurdle nor a problem of inadequate consideration in
cases of implied-in-fact modification to the employment contract. See supra notes 89-94.
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fect.'" 164 The court clearly recognized that basic contract principles
permit the parties to define by agreement the duration and termi-
nation terms of the employment contract, allowing them to overcome
the law's at-will presumption if they so desire.165 Thus, evidence of
the parties' conduct, the employer's practices, policies, actions or
communications arising during the course of the employment rela-
tionship, along with the practices of the industry in question, must
be evaluated in any determination of the duration and termination
terms of the employment contract. 166 Further, the Foley court ex-
pressly rejected any claim that consideration, apart from the em-
ployee's rendition of services or promise to render services to the
employer, is necessary to create an enforceable contractual obligation
to terminate on terms other than at-will. 67
The absence of any discussion by the Foley court concerning
California statutes dealing with contractual modification, 6 as well
as the overall tenor of the majority opinion, suggest that the court
did not analyze the alleged implied-in-fact agreement not to terminate
absent just cause in a modification context. The majority intimated
164. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 675, 765 P.2d 373, 383, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 221 (1988). The court observed that had Foley further alleged an express agreement
by the parties that these guidelines governed Foley's employment, Foley could have also stated
a cause of action for breach of "an express oral contract." Id. at 675 n.20, 765 P.2d at 383
n.20, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.20. As the majority later correctly acknowleged, there is no
difference in legal effect of a promise expressed orally, in writing, through conduct, or by any
combination thereof. Id. at 678 n.21, 765 P.2d at 385 n.21, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223 n.21 (citing
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) CoNTAcTs § 4 (1981)). The Restatement provides: "A promise may
be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CoNTRAcTs § 4 (1981).
165. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 675, 765 P.2d at 383, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In so holding, the
Court specifically adhered to the reasoning of Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
166. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 677, 680, 765 P.2d at 385, 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223, 225.
167. Id. at 678, 680-81, 765 P.2d at 385-86, 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25. Other collateral
writings or agreements may serve as evidence that the parties intended that the employment
arrangement not be terminable at will. Id. at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d at 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr.
at 225 n.23.
168. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1698 (West 1985). That section provides:
(a) A contract in writing may be modified by a contract in writing.
(b) A contract in writing may be modified by an oral agreement to the extent that
the oral agreement is executed by the parties.
(c) Unless the contract otherwise expressly provides, a contract in writing may be
modified by an oral agreement supported by new consideration. The statute of
frauds (Section 1624) is required to be satisfied if the contract as modified is within
its provisions.
(d) Nothing in this section precludes in an appropriate case the application of rules
of law concerning estoppel, oral novation and substitution of a new agreement,
rescission of a written contract by an oral agreement, waiver of a provision of a
written contract, or oral independent collateral contracts.
Id.
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that the terms of the parties' contract governing termination had
been "filled in" during the course of performance, 169 rejecting the
"formalistic approach" that "the manifestations of intent must be
evidenced by definite express terms if promises are to be enforce-
able."' 170 This approach eases the burden facing an employee meeting
169. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 679-80, 765 P.2d at 386-87, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
170. Id. at 679, 765 P.2d at 386, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Accord, Rohwer, supra note 7,
at 769 n.56. The great majority of employment relationships are entered into by oral agreement
of the employer and the employee. Nonetheless, the true mechanics of contract formation in
this context are a bit of a mystery. Arguably, under the traditional contract analysis, a
terminable-at-will agreement is not even really a contract because it can be ended instantly
after it is formed, and thus the promises are illusory.
More logically, a contractual arrangement arises from the outset of the relationship with
the parties agreeing upon certain elements, such as wages, hours, and to a varying degree,
other matters dealing with working conditions. However, these employment agreements typically
fail to specify a duration of employment. Courts generally construe an employment relationship
as terminable at will when the employment contract is silent as to duration, unless there is
evidence of contrary intent. See J. CAws uu & J. PEmuu.o, CONTRACTS, § 2-9, at 59 (1987);
E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 7.17, at 532 (1982). In California, this presumption of a
terminable at will relationship is buttressed by the existence of Labor Code section 2922. See
note 6 supra. Under this analysis, subsequent conduct or words may modify that at-will
provision, creating an agreement under which the employee may be terminated only for cause.
See J. McCARTHY, Ptntrvr DAOaEs N WRONGFuL DIScHARGE CASES, § 3.54, at 205 (1985),
in which the author explains:
In most cases, an employee's assent to an offer of employment, thus creating an
employment contract if the employee furnished consideration for the contract, is
shown by the employee's beginning work in response to the offer. The employee's
acceptance can be shown by action as well as by verbal statement. [citations]. [ ]
However, an employee will commonly allege that, after his or her beginning work,
the employer offered to modify the existing at-will employment contract or create a
new contract. Under these circumstances, courts commonly hold that an employee's
continuing to work demonstrates assent to the new or modified offer, because the
employee could have terminated his or her employment.
It is the employer's external manifestations, not his or her hidden intent, that leads the
employee into a reasonable expectation that their employment is terminable only for cause.
E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 3.6. This "objective theory" has long controlled in
California. See Brant v. California Dairies, 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133-34, 48 P.2d 13, 16 (1935) ("[I]t
is now a settled principle of the law of contract that the undisclosed intentions of the parties
are, in the absence of mistake, fraud, etc. immaterial, and that the outward manifestation or
expression of assent is controlling"). A third theory of contract formation has been suggested.
Under this view, the contract formation process is on-going. As one author explains:
Those decisions which take a more broad view of employment contract terms can
usually be seen to operate from the assumption that the final statement of the
relationship between this particular employer and employee need not be manifested
on the first day they entered the employment relationship. The originally indefinite
contract began to take on more detailed terms and conditions as the relationship
grew. A manual distributed by the boss and initially left unread by the employee
will eventually become an established term of the contract after the manual and the
relationship continued to coexist for a period of time. Only when viewed as an
agreement which is undergoing rather constant modification can an employment
contract be understood to contain terms based on such things as assurance, longevity,
and general practices and policies of the employer and the industry.
Rowher, supra note 7, at 769 n.56. This author finds the second view the most satisfying,
though is aware that consideration hurdles can arise if the focus is on modification of contrary
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the requirements of form imposed by virtue of California statutory
law. 7
1
1. Written Employment Contracts
Written employment contracts may raise potential obstacles to an
employee's attempts to assert an implied-in-fact modification. First,
the statute of frauds must be satisfied if the contract as modified
falls within its provisions. 72 Where the contract is modified from
one authorizing termination at will to a contract requiring just cause,
no statute of frauds problem arises, however, because the contract
can be performed within one year. 173 If the contract contains a
provision initially agreed upon by the parties that expressly requires
modifications to be in writing, a "private statute of frauds," an oral
modification may nevertheless be enforceable on a waiver or estoppel
theory. 74 Other theories that may make the subsequent promise
enforceable, notwithstanding the private statute of frauds, include
oral novation and substitution of a new agreement, waiver of a
provision of a written contract, rescission of a written contract by
an oral agreement, or an oral collateral agreement.1
75
Second, additional consideration may be required to support the
modification. Yet, insofar as consideration is required to support
modification, 76 the logic of the majority in Foley suggests,'177 if not
terms in written employment contracts. Under the teaching of Foley, consideration should not
prove to be a problem in these cases, as the employee's continued efforts are enough
consideration for the modification. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (West 1985). See supra note 168.
172. Id. § 1698(c). California's statute of frauds is found in California Civil Code section
1624, and invalidates "[ain agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof" unless the contract "or some note or memorandum thereof, [is] in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent." Id. § 1624(a)
(West Supp. 1989).
173. Cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 671-75, 765 P.2d 373, 381-383,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219-221 (1988).
174. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1698(d) (West 1985). See D.L. Godbey & Sons Constr. Co. v.
Deane, 39 Cal. 2d 429, 432, 246 P.2d 946, 948 (1952); Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.
App. 2d 410, 421, 258 P.2d 497, 503 (1953); Panno v. Russo, 82 Cal. App. 2d 408, 412, 186
P.2d 452, 454 (1947).
175. See infra notes 193-199.
176. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1698 (a), (b), (c) (West 1985). The statute is silent on the
issue of whether a written modification of a written contract must be supported by a new
consideration.
See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1697 (West 1985) (regarding oral contracts, which constitute the
majority of employment contracts). Section 1697 provides: "A contract not in writing may be
modified in any respect by consent of the parties, in writing, without a new consideration,
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directly holds, 178 that consideration for the modification would be
provided by the employee's subsequent rendition of services or prom-
ise to render services. The majority's discussion of mutuality of
obligation evidences that the employee's subsequent rendition of
services, or subsequent promise to provide such services, constitutes
consideration for an express or implied-in-fact modification providing
that the employee will not be terminated absent just cause. The Foley
court soundly rejected the defendant-employer's lack of "mutuality
of obligation" argument, which claimed that consideration beyond
the employee's continued services is required because of the employ-
ee's freedom to terminate the employment relationship. Noting that
the benefits of greater loyalty and productivity may be obtained by
employers, the court rejected any requirement of additional consid-
eration to support a contract on terms other than at will. 179 The
majority's analysis, consistent with general contract law, determined
that the employee's continued performance of his or her duties,
despite the freedom to terminate the relationship, is consideration
for the employer's promise modifying the at-will agreement.8 0 Some
California cases, such as Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem-
ical Corp.8" which held that an alleged oral modification of a written
and is extinguished thereby to the extent of the modification". Id. Presumably, an oral
modification of an oral contract must be supported by consideration. See id. (by negative
implication).
177. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 679, 765 P.2d 373, 386, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 224 (1988).
178. Id. at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d at 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.23.
179. Id. at 680-81, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
180. Id. at 680-81, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225. See Hathaway v. General Mills,
Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986) (if employee, after notice of changes decreasing
employee's commissions continues working, employee has accepted the offer to modify the
employment contract); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627, 630 (Minn.
1983) (employee's continued performance of his duties despite his freedom to terminate
employment constituted acceptance of employer's offer to modify the employment contract
making employee terminable only for just cause). See also Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth
Hosp. Center, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) ("[t]he employee must accept the offer by
commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy statement. When these conditions
are present, then the employee's continued work constitutes consideration for the promises
contained in the statement, and under traditional principles a valid contract is formed."); J.
McCARTHy, Pusrmnv DAmAGEs iN WRONGFuL DiSCHcARGE CAsEs § 3.54 (1985).
181. 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986). In Malmstrom, the court held that
the employee's agreement to relocate to Florida from California did not constitute the new
consideration required to support the alleged oral modification of the written employment
agreement specifying an at-will employment relationship. The court contended that the relo-
cation was not the result of a bargained for exchange between the employer and the employee;
rather, the move was incident to retaining employment in light of the elimination of the
plaintiff's position in California. The court did not consider whether the employee's rendition
of services, or promise to do so, could constitute consideration for the alleged oral modification.
Id. at 318, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 829-30. In light of the California Supreme Court's approach to
consideration in Foley, the Malmstrom rationale is highly questionable.
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employment contract specifying at-will employment failed for lack
of consideration, overly restrict the doctrine of consideration.
8 2
Although basic contract principles can support an oral modification
to the written employment agreement, employees alleging such a
modification limiting the employer's nearly unqualified freedom to
terminate will encounter a troubling and analytically muddled body
of California case law that arguably suggests that express written
contracts preclude subsequent contradictory implied promises as a
matter of law. 83 These cases appear to have confused the cluster of
issues arising in the context of the parol evidence rule and contract
interpretation with the issues arising in the context of modification.&4
Under the parol evidence rule, prior or contemporaneous oral
promises that expressly contradict express written terms of an inte-
182. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 482, 199
Cal. Rptr. 613, 621 (1984) (a written at-will provision precludes an implied-in-fact modification
of an on-going employment agreement because "[t]here cannot be a valid express contract and
an implied contract, each embracing the same subject but requiring different results"). One
author acknowledged that Shapiro and other cases asserting that express contract terms bar
the formation of an implied contract (see, e.g., Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849,
852 (C.D. Cal. 1983)) are "confusing the issue" of express and implied-in-fact contracts. J.
McCArTHY, supra note 180, at 206. The Foley majority acknowledged these cases without
clear support or criticism. The court noted the ambiguity in the cases stating that Shapiro can
be interpreted to preclude an implied-in-fact modification of an on-going employment agreement
when some express written provision insists on the employee's at-will status. Because Foley
did not involve a written contract, the court did not analyze the issue. Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 676, 765 P.2d 373, 384, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 222 (1988).
Legislation is pending that would expressly alter the effect of cases such as Shapiro. Senator
Rosenthal's bill, S.B. 115, 1988-89 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Dec. 22, 1988), narrowly passing out
of the Senate Judiciary Committee in early June of 1989, would clarify California law, making
certain that an employer's words or conduct creating a reasonable expectation of employment
terminable only for just cause in an employee, will modify the at-will employment relationship,
notwithstanding a written employment agreement specifying an at-will employment relationship.
Although, it is the author's position that Shapiro and similar cases are incorrect, based on
current California contract law, the legislation would be helpful in clearing up some existing
confusion.
184. For example, in Shapiro, the plaintiff-employee alleged breach of an implied-in-fact
contract not to terminate his employment absent good cause. The employee signed a writing
indicating that his employment was terminable at will, but alleged that he was advised, orally
by supervisors and in writing through benefit brochures, that he would not be terminated
absent just cause. The court's opinion suggested that the alleged oral assurances were made
and the benefit brochures distributed subsequent to the execution of the writing. Shapiro, 152
Cal. App. 3d at 473, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 615. In upholding the trial court's demurrer to the
employee's claim of breach of an implied-in-fact contract, the court observed: "There cannot
be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject but
requiring different results." Id. at 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 622. This language suggests that the
subsequent oral assurances and written benefit brochures were inadmissable to contradict the
prior written at-will employment agreement. If Shapiro, however, was indeed an implied-in-
fact modification case, the alleged modification was created by oral and written words following
the formation of the original at-will employment agreement. As a result, the evidence of
modification clearly would not be barred by the parol evidence rule.
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grated agreement may not be introduced into evidence.
185 The parol
evidence rule, however, applies only to representations occurring prior
to, or simultaneously with, the execution of the written document.
186
Accordingly, subsequent oral modifications of the written agreement
may be effective. 187 If Shapiro was indeed an implied-in-fact modi-
fication case, the alleged modification was created by oral and written
words following the formation of the original at-will employment
agreement. As a result, they would not be barred by the parol
evidence rule. While perhaps it is sensible to presume that parties to
an employment contract would not make prior or contemporaneous
agreements that directly contradict express terms of their written
employment agreement, no such presumption can arise regarding
subsequent express or implied-in-fact promises contradicting the writ-
ing.188 Indeed, subsequent modifications to an employment contract
are entirely logical.8 9 Thus, the parol evidence rule does not limit
subsequent modification of an at-will employment agreement.
Another area which should be considered falls within the realm of
contract interpretation, where a debate rages about the meaning of
a written contractual term. If the statement - "there cannot be a
valid express contract and an implied contract each embracing the
185. See CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1856(a) (West 1983). Section 1856(a) provides: "Terms
set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with
respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement." Id. See, e.g., Anderson v. Savin Corp.,
206 Cal. App. 3d 356, 364, 254 Cal. Rptr. 627, 630-631 (1988); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum,
187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 318, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829 (1986). But see McLain v. Great American
Insurance, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1989) (misstating parol evidence as
prohibiting the introduction of any extrinsic evidence varying or contradicting terms of
integrated written instrument, and thus misapplying the rule to evidence of subsequent modi-
fication).
186. See, e.g., In re Gaines' Estate, 15 Cal. 2d 255, 264-65, 100 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1940);
Marani v. Jackson, 183 Cal. App. 3d 695, 699 n.2, 228 Cal. Rptr. 518, 520 n.2 (1986);
Beggerly v. Gbur, 112 Cal. App. 3d 180, 188, 169 Cal. Rptr. 166, 171 (1980). See also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1625 (West 1985). Section 1625 provides: "The execution of a contract in writing,
whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations
concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument." Id.
187. See, e.g., Chahon v. Kersey Kinsey Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 548, 551, 343 P.2d 614,
616 (1959). Nor would collateral or independent agreements be prohibited. See, e.g., Wright
v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 252, 258, 79 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15 (1970).
188. Gedlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal. App. 3d 263, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279
(1987).
189. To the extent that an employee, who begins as an at-will employee, progresses
successfully over time through a company, receiving continuous praise and bonuses, it is quite
logical that the employer would wish to assure that employee's continued service and modify
the employment agreement so as to provide job security. Cf. McLain v. Great American Ins.
Co., 208 Cal. 3d 1476, 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1989) (because employer expressly reserved the
right to change terms and conditions of employment, subsequent implied-in-fact modification
possible).
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same subject, but requiring different results"' 90 - which has been
asserted by several California courts, has any relevance at all, it is
within the realm of interpretation of written agreements. In Califor-
nia, extrinsic evidence, evidence outside the writing itself, is admis-
sible to explain the meaning of a written term only if the term is
reasonably susceptible to the proffered interpretation. 9' But where
the focus is on whether the writing was modified, extrinsic evidence,
if relevant to the fact of modification, is necessarily relevant con-
cerning the issue of contract modification, since the parties to a
written agreement obviously retain the freedom to vary, alter and
change, as well as to supplement or delete, terms of a written
agreement through contract modification. 92
A more challenging requirement of form is presented when an
employee alleges subsequent express oral promises or subsequent
conduct modifying a written agreement expressly forbidding oral
modifications and insisting that all modifications be in writing-the
"private statute of frauds" situation.' 91 Although "no oral modifi-
cation" clauses in written employment contracts are enforceable, 194 a
variety of theories may provide relief to an employee who relies on
words or implied-in-fact conduct ostensibly changing the at-will na-
ture of the employment relationship. For example, the employee may
assert that the employer is estopped to raise the "no oral modifica-
tion" clause or that it was orally waived.1 95 To enforce an oral
190. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 482, 199
Cal. Rptr. 613, 622 (1984). See supra note 183.
191. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 40, 442 P.2d 641,
644, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968).
192. In its simplest sense, the Shapiro court's assertion is true. There cannot be conflicting
terms simultaneously. The later expression of the parties' intent supplants the original written
term. Indeed, the California Civil Code specifically contemplates the propriety of oral modi-
fications to written terms. See, e.g., CAL. Cwr. CODE § 1698(c) (West 1985). Section 1698provides: "Unless the contract expressly provides, a contract in writing may be modified by
an oral agreement supported by new consideration." Id.
Interestingly, this broad statement of California law appears first in Wal-noon Corp. v.Hill, 45 Cal. App. 3d 605, 613, 119 Cal. Rptr. 646, 650 (1975), an action focusing on the
propriety of the trial court's grant of restitutionary relief to the plaintiff-lessee. The appellatecourt reversed the trial court, equated "implied contract" with equitable restitutionary relief,
and concluded that recovery on a restitutionary theory was incompatible and inappropriatewhere there could be no recovery on a contract theory. Id. at 615, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
193. See, e.g., Marani v. Jackson, 183 Cal. App. 3d 695, 228 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1986);
Beggerly v. Gbur, 112 Cal. App. 3d 180, 169 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1980).
194. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1698(c) (West 1985).
195. See id. § 1698(d). A similar estoppel argument can be made if the modification lacks
consideration. See, e.g., Malmstrom v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299,
318, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830 (1986) (narrowly viewing estoppel doctrine and finding it
inapplicable'under facts of case). See supra note 181.
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modification on an estoppel or waiver theory, the employee must
produce significant evidence of reliance. 196 Alternatively, the employee
may argue that the parties impliedly rescinded the written agreement
containing the "no oral modification" clause and substituted in its
place an oral agreement allowing termination only for cause. 97 Fur-
ther, the employee might argue that an independent collateral contract
providing for termination on a basis other than at-will was formed. 198
Ultimately, it is also possible that written employment policies and
personnel manuals may satisfy the requirement of a written modifi-
cation as long as the writings in issue provide part of the basis for
the employee's argument that the contract was modified to provide
greater job security than was originally provided in the parties' written
agreement.199
Previous wrongful termination cases have been extremely ambig-
uous about the contract analysis underlying their determination that
the employee may assert an action for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract. This uncertainty was largely due to the overlapping, and
more lucrative, alternative ground of recovery for tortious breach.
After Foley, contract analysis will necessarily become the central
focus for defining the parameters of most wrongful termination
actions and a thoughtful and thorough contract analysis will be
critical.
196. Cf. Monarco v. LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (to plead and prove
estoppel to assert the statute of frauds, plaintiff must show that unconscionable injury or
unjust enrichment would result from failure to enforce the oral contract due to plaintiff's
reliance on the oral contract or representations that a writing is not necessary, or will be
executed or the statute will not be relied upon as a defense); U.C.C. § 2-209 (5) (West 1987).
197. Novation is the substitution by agreement of a new obligation for an existing one,
with intent to extinguish the latter. People v. Metcalf, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 144 Cal. Rptr.
657, 661-62 (1978); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1530-1532 (West 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNRcs §§ 279, 280 (1981). A novation may be oral even though the original contract was
in writing. Tucker v. Schumacher, 90 Cal. App. 2d 71, 74, 202 P.2d 327, 329 (1949). Rescission
is the mutual cancellation of executory contractual rights. REsTATEmENT (SEcoNDm) CONTRACTS
§ 283 (1981). Although mutual consent is required, it need not be in writing, even if the
contract itself was written, but, rather, may be oral or manifested by conduct. Kane v. Sklar,
122 Cal. App. 2d 480, 482, 265 P.2d 29, 31 (1954).
198. Lacy Mfg. Co. v. Gold Crown Mining, 52 Cal. App. 2d 568, 577, 126 P.2d 644, 649
(1942).
199. But see Anderson v. Savin, 206 Cal. App. 3d 356, 364 n.2, 254 Cal. Rptr. 627, 630-
31 n.2 (1988) (suggesting that the parol evidence rule prohibits terms of the defendant's
operating procedures manual from altering terms of a written employment letter stating
employee is terminable at will because the employment letter did not expressly incorporate
provision of the manual). The court's point is uncertain - surely subsequent employer conduct
or words are unaffected by the operation of the parol evidence rule.
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2. Disclaimers
An employer's handbooks, personnel policies, manuals, procedures
and termination guidelines have been looked to with increasing
frequency as a basis for an employee to assert an implied-in-fact
promise that the employee may only be terminated for good cause. 00
Indeed, the Foley court makes clear that an employer's personnel
policies, and conduct consistent with the policies and procedures,
alone may create a reasonable expectation in the employee's mind
of job security. 201
200. See supra note 142; Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925 (1981). These policies may create expectations that raise employee expectations
about matters other than duration of employment as well. See Note, Employees Handbooks
and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 Duira L.J. 196, 214 ("[E]mployees who are promised
that grievance and termination procedures will be followed cannot be properly discharged,
under their employment at-will contracts, without having first been given the benefit of the
procedures promised in the handbook.").
201. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 680, 765 P.2d 373, 387, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 225 (1988). Personnel policies can become part of the contractual guarantee if theparties mutually intended to create a contract that such rules are to be followed. These policies
may become part of an employee's oral contract of employment. Burton v. Security Pac. Nat'lBank, 197 Cal. App. 3d 972, 977-8, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280 (1988). Foley's contract action
was premised on the creation of an implied-in-fact term limiting the employer's right to
terminate. This implied-in-fact promise developed through a course of conduct and written
policies of the employer. An independent contract basis-arising from express oral or written
statements of the employer-will often arise in these employment cases, even where theemployer has sought to prevent the creation of an implied-in-fact promise. Indeed, the Foley
majority expressly left this issue open, noting that Foley had merely alleged that he "under-
stood" that the employer's guidelines requiring good cause for discharge applied to him. Hadhe alleged, the court noted, that "the parties expressly agreed that these guidelines governed
his employment, he could state a cause of action for breach of an express oral contract."
Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 675 n.20, 765 P.2d at 383 n.20, 254 Cal Rptr. at 77 n.20. Though thecourt claims that Foley did not allege facts supporting an oral modification claim, the distinction
is quite subtle. Foley alleged that the employer's course of conduct, including oral represen-
tations, created Foley's reasonable expectation that he would be terminated only for cause. A
breach of an express oral contract claim would be appropriate had Foley alleged "explicit
words by which the parties agreed that he would not be terminated without cause." Id, Itappears that the lack of specificity about the "oral representations" is what prevented the
express contract claim. The court does not suggest that Foley's recovery would be affected by
this additional basis for breach of contract, though it would provide a second contract theory
in addition to the implied-in-fact Pugh theory. Notably, the court does not suggest that any
consideration beyond continued employment is necessary for the creation of an express promise
not to terminate absent just cause.
Written or oral statements to an employee objectively manifesting an intent that the employee
only be terminated for cause, may lead to the creation of an express promise that the employee
cannot be terminated absent cause. A modification leading to a binding promise may arise in
other contexts as well. If an employer expressly represents to an employee, for example, thatthe employee will receive pre-discharge notice, this may become a binding term in their
contractual relationship.
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Employers are under no obligation to disseminate employee hand-
books or manuals, but will be held accountable for the promises
made therein.202 As the drafter of the document, the employer chooses
the language included in the manual and is free to assert that the
manual is not part of any employment agreement and that employ-
ment is terminable at will.203 Properly drafted language has been
determined "to preserve the presumption of at-will employment,"
relieving the employer from any obligation to follow disciplinary
procedures outlined in the handbook and enabling the employer to
discharge the employee for any reason.? 4 An employer's assertions,
seeking to exclude the manuals from any employment contract, must
be very clear and precise. 2°5 Where there is clear language of dis-
claimer, stressing the at-will nature of the employment, it is difficult
for an employee to assert in good faith that he or she formed a
legitimate expectation that employment was terminable only for just
cause.
206
Disclaimers alone, however, will not provide complete protection
to the employer. Where there are conduct and assurances that run
contrary to the disclaimer, courts have been increasingly willing to
find a triable issue of fact about whether, "under the totality of the
circumstances," notwithstanding the language of the disclaimer, good
cause was required for termination. 2°7 Notably, the Foley court, too,
stressed that the "totality of the circumstances" will determine if the
202. Employers choose to distribute employee manuals because of the benefits of increased
productivity and work force satisfaction which may result from the dissemination of employ-
ment manuals. Wootley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985). That court noted
also that "[t]he provisions of the manual concerning job security shall be considered binding
unless the manual elsewhere prominently and unmistakably indicates that those provisions shall
not be binding." Id. at 1269.
203. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984).
204. Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc. 398 N.W.2d 120, 123 (N.D. 1986). The disclaimer
that was upheld provided: "This Employee Handbook has been drafted as a guideline for our
employees. It shall not be construed to form a contract between the Company and its employees.
Rather, it describes the Company's general philosophy concerning policies and procedures."
Id. at 121. See generally Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees At Will: Are Disclaimers a
Final Solution? 15 FORDHAM U"w. L.J. 533 (1987).
205. Mauk, supra note 1, at 218.
206. See Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
207. See, e.g., Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1984) (notwithstanding
written disclaimer in employment application signed by plaintiff, "jury could find, based on
the 'totality of the circumstances,' that good cause was required for plaintiff's termination
...."); Helle v. Landmark, 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ohio App. 1984) ("To the extent that the
oral assurances ... conflicted with the manual's disclaimers, or induced [employees] to
disregard their significance, we hold that such representations will negate the effect of [these]
disclaimers .... "). See generally, Scherb, The Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability
Under Employee Handbook Provisions, 12 J. Corn. L. 105 (1986).
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employer's words or conduct have created a reasonable expectation
of employment terminable only for just cause °.20
Because the issues arising in the realm of implied-in-fact promises
are securely anchored in contract, an employer's clear statement to
an employee that employment is terminable at will, buttressed by
consistent policies and conduct, will prevent the formation of an
implied-in-fact contract term that employment may only be termi-
nated for "just cause. ' 209 But when the employers act or speak
inconsistently, when the "totality of the circumstances" suggests
employees may reasonably believe that they are no longer terminable
at will, an employee-manual disclaimer cannot be viewed as a bar to
liability.210
F. Recoverable Damages After Foley
A central effect of the court's decision is to prevent a wrongfully
terminated employee from recovering tort damages, unless there is a
discharge in violation of public policy. Typically, tort recovery, which
seeks to return the injured party to the position he or she was in
prior to the tortious conduct, 21 is more generous to the plaintiff
than a recovery in contract. In a tort action the injured plaintiff
may recover for all the harm proximately caused, whether or not it
could have been anticipated.2 12 Accordingly, recovery of damages for
emotional distress are recoverable upon sufficient proof.213 Further,
punitive damages may be awarded for outrageous conduct to deter
similar conduct in the future.21 4 It was thus no surprise that plaintiffs'
208. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680-82, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
209. See supra note 37.
210. One author suggests that a disclaimer, though not a bar to litigation, is a defense to
be raised during litigation. Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on
the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 31 VL. L. REv. 335, 359 (1986). This focus seems
misplaced. While neither a bar to litigation nor a defense, the existence of a disclaimer is
important evidence about whether an employee could have reasonably interpreted the employer's
words or conduct as creating employment terminable only for just cause.
211. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 92
(5th ed. 1984).
212. See Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the
Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. LAw NEws 1 (1984). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1970)
which provides: "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of
damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately cause thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not." Id.
213. Traynor, supra note 212, at 1.
214. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979): "Punitive damages are damages,
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attorneys enthusiastically attempted to formulate a wrongful termi-
nation action as one sounding in tort.215 Foreclosed from seeking tort
damages absent a violation of public policy, the plaintiff in a
wrongful termination action is now limited to the recovery of contract
damages. A critical issue thus becomes the scope of contract recovery
in wrongful termination cases. While contract law has often kept
recovery artificially limited in this context, a more honest and lib-
erlized view of contract damages may ultimately inject greater
stability into the wrongful termination arena while providing fair
compensation to the wrongfully terminated employee.
Contract remedies are designed to protect the justified expectations
of the parties; to put the injured party in the position he or she
would have been in had the contract not been breached. 216 Contract
other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others from similar conduct in the future."
California recently narrowed the permissible scope of punitive damage awards in tort actions.
Traditionally punitive damages, or "exemplary damages" as they are called in the California
statutes, are appropriate where the injured plaintiff proves by a preponderance - that it is
more likely than not - that the defendant "has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice."
See 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1498, sec. 5 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294) (standard for burden
of proof for issues of oppression, fraud, or malice is not specified). See, e.g., Taylor v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979). In Taylor, the
California Supreme Court indicated a willingness to permit punitive damages liberally in tort
actions, holding that a defendant's act of driving while intoxicated evidences a "conscious
disregard for the safety of others" and, thus, constitutes "malice" for the purpose of awarding
exemplary damages. Id. at 899-900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699. As a result of
efforts by the defense bar, insurance companies and other business interests, the California
legislature recently significantly altered Civil Code section 3294. In addition to increasing the
burden of proof on the plaintiff from a preponderance of the evidence to "clear and
convincing" evidence, the revised statute, which became effective January 1, 1988, permits
recovery of punitive damages only when, in addition to the earlier standards, the defendant's
conduct is deemed "despicable." CAL. Crw. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989).
215. Foley's limitation on recoverable damages has led to adding statutory and intentional
tort claims to wrongful termination complaints. But there has nonetheless been some deterrence
to filing wrongful termination cases due to the limited recovery. One attorney admitted that
he could no longer "afford to finance cases through a contingent fee agreement where the
employee was not earning 'six figures' and the contract losses were small." Attorneys Still
Filing Wrongful Termination Cases, The Daily Recorder, Jan. 19, 1989, at 3.
216. The measure of damages, seeking to provide the "benefit of the bargain," protects
the promisee's expectation interest. E.A. FARswoaT, supra note 9, § 2.1. The objective of
contract law is not to compel the promisor to keep the promise nor even to prevent breach
by the promisor; rather, the focus of contract law traditionally is to provide a means of
redress for breach by the promisee. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COL. L. REv. 1145, 1146-47 (1970). Thus, regardless of the breaching party's motive, contract
damages generally seek to avoid placing the injured party in a better position than he or she
would have been in had the contract been performed. E.A. FAuswoRm, supra note 9, §
12.8; RESTATEMENT (SECON-D) OF CONRACTS §§ 344, 347 and 351 (1981). As one author
explained:
The traditional view of the contract measure of damages is that the injured party
should be put in as good a position as he would have had if perfomance had been
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damages may extend beyond the terms of the contract itself, however.
It is well established that the injured party may recover all damages
that, at the time the contract was entered into, would foreseeably
flow from the breach of the contract as well as those specifically
within the contemplation of the parties. 217 Because of the interests
involved, contract damages are typically more narrowly circumscribed
than tort damages.218 Further, because contract law imposes strict
liability and does not seek to punish the breaching party no matter
how "reprehensible" the breach, punitive damages are unavailable
for breach of contract. 219 In essence, liability for breach of contract
is generally limited to "recovery for pecuniary harm." ' 0
The court appears unanimous in its recognition that traditional
contract damages are inadequate in the context of discharged em-
ployees, specifically inviting courts and the legislature to consider the
appropriate recovery for a wrongfully terminated employee asserting
an action for breach of contract. Although the majority specifically
leaves open the appropriate measure of damages in a wrongful
rendered as promised. Usage varies in labeling the components of such damages,
but here they will be called (1) the benefit of the bargain as measured by the value
of the promised performance (which in the case of a sale is the value of the property
if delivered in accordance with the bargain); and (2) consequential damages, com-
prised of incidental expenses and losses, and gains foreclosed by the breach.
Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 CoLum. L. Rnv. 40, 42 (1974) (footnote omitted).
217. This principle is reflected in California's Civil Code section 3294, which provides:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will
compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.
CAL. Cry. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989). This incorporates the foreseeability limit first
established in the well-known English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
Hadley also permits recovery of damages that, though not ordinarily foreseeable, are actually
known to the breaching party at the time the agreement is reached. Note, Extending the Bad
Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts, 65 B.U.L. Rnv. 355, 368 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Bad Faith Tort].
218. The development of contract law sought to recognize the right of a party to a contract
to breach if he or she so chose, strictly limiting the recoverable damages to "compensatory"
damages following such a breach to a scope far less than that available in the law of torts.
G. GInioR, DEATH OF CONTRACT 14-15 (1974). See also Comment, Reconstructing Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing a a Tort, 73 CALM. L. Rnv. 1291,
1291 n.3 (1985).
219. E.A. FARNswoRT, supra note 37, § 12.8 (1982)("[N]o matter how reprehensible the
breach, damages that are punitive, in the sense of being in excess of those required to
compensate the injured party for his lost expectation, are not ordinarily awarded for breach
of contract.") See Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 405, 303 P. 2d 1029, 1033 (1956); Frazier
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 106-07, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892 (1985).
See also CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989) (expressly prohibiting punitive damages in
any action "arising from contract").
220. Note, Bad Faith Tort, supra note 217, at 368 (citing A. CoRBN, CONTRACTS, § 1076
(1964)).
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termination action based on breach of contract,2 1 it acknowledges a
"widespread perception that present compensation" under contract
doctrine is inadequate for the wrongfully terminated worker.m The
majority also states its "belie[f] that focus on available contract
remedies offers the most appropriate method for expanding available
relief for wrongful terminations.' '
Working within the accepted contract damage context, more com-
plete compensation for the wrongfully discharged employee can be
fashioned. Attorneys representing wrongfully discharged plaintiffs
must take care to include all appropriate elements in their damage
calculation and argue for a more realistic assessment of those damages
foreseeably flowing from breach.
1. Pecuniary Loss
In terms of pecuniary loss, the usual test is that the employee
terminated in breach of contract is to recover the "amount of
221. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 682 n.24, 765 P.2d 373, 388 n.24,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 211, 226 n.24 (1988).
222. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236. See also id. at 694, 765 P.2d at
397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235 ("The most frequently cited reason for the move to extend tort
remedies into this context is the perception that traditional contract remedies are inadequate
to compensate for certain breaches."). The majority makes certain its antipathy to punitive
damages in the wrongful termination context, however. Id. at 683, 697 n.35, 765 P.2d at 389,
399 n.35, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 237 n.35. Although in a tort-based action the plaintiff had
to put on additional proof to recover punitive damages, the majority assumes that an action
for tortious breach will lead to the imposition of punitive damages on the employer. See supra
note 214.
223. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239. The court went on
to explain:
We are not unmindful of the legitimate concerns of employees who fear arbitrary
and improper discharges that may have a devastating effect on their economic and
social status. Nor are we unaware of or unsympathetic to claims that contract
remedies for breaches of contract are insufficient because they do not fully compen-
sate due to their failure to include attorney fees and their restrictions on foreseeable
damages.
Id. See also Traynor, supra note 212, in which the author suggests several possible bases to
expand the contract damage recovery for bad faith breach of contract, while eschewing punitive
damages as a possible remedy. He contends that the contract damage focus is the appropriate
one noting that
[s]pending energy and refined analysis on whether a breach of contract is also or
alternatively a tort diverts attention from the central economic problem, results in
unproductive search for an elusive rationale, creates opportunities for clever pleading
and position-taking strategems, stimulates litigation over categories such as 'special
relationships' and 'denial of the existence of a contract' and encourages evasion of
present statutory mandate that punitive damages are not available for breach of
contract.
Id. at 12. Traynor, however, acknowledges the traditional inadequacy of contract damages.
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compensation agreed on for the remaining period of service, less the
amount the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned,
or with reasonable effort might have earned, in employment of the
same or a similar character during the remaining period."2'  The
measure of damages includes lost fringe benefits, calculated at the
employee's cost of replacing them, as well as lost salary. In most
cases, the employment relationship is of an unspecified duration and,
thus, a preliminary determination must be made about how long the
employee would have worked for the employer. 26 The wrongfully
terminated employee apparently may recover damages, subject to the
employee's obligation to mitigate damages,2 7 for what would have
been the duration of that worker's employment.2
California law requires that a party injured by the breach of a
contract do everything reasonably possible to mitigate his or her own
loss, thereby reducing the damages for which the other party has
224. J. McCARTHY, supra note 180, § 3.90. Accord Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal.
App. 3d 762 n.14, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 208 n.14 (1988). In Pugh II, the court approved the
trial judge's instruction that, if the jury finds an implied contract for employment, the plaintiff
is to recover "the total amount of wages and benefits which would have been received under
the terms of the employment contract, less any sum which he has earned or could have earned
in other employment by reasonable efforts." Id. See also Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181-82, 474 P.2d 689, 692, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1972). "The
general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount
of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively
proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other
employment." Id.
225. Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., I Cal. 3d 600, 607-08, 463 P. 2d 426, 431, 83 Cal. Rptr.
202, 207 (1970) (plaintiff entitled to recover replacement cost of life insurance, hospital and
medical coverage for himself and his spouse). Some jurisdictions calculate the value of lost
fringe benefits by evaluating the employer's cost of providing the benefits. J. McCARTmY,
supra note 80, § 3.91. Other types of compensatory contract damages permitted for breach of
an employment contract include: intangible fringe benefits, such as the assurance of a 40-hour
work week and a comfortable indoor working environment; expenses incurred in searching for
new employment; expenses incurred in relocating to new employment; and attorney fees and
expenses of litigation. Id.
226. This determination is made by considering such factors as the average tenure of
workers at the employers place of business, the plaintiff's testimony about his or her intentions,
plaintiff's past employment history, and the amount of time that the employee had already
worked for the defendant.
227. See infra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
228. Some limitation on the time period arises from the initial determination of the
employee's likely tenure and from the duty to mitigate damages. Some arbitrary limit, however,
may be set to prevent employer liability for an unduly extended period of time. See, e.g.,
MoNr. CODE ANN., § 39-2-911 (1988), which terminates an employer's obligation to pay wages
and fringe benefits after 4 years from the date of discharge. It should be noted, however, that
Montana permits a broader scope of recovery than post-Foley California, even permitting
punitive damages in certain situations. Some courts limit the duration for which damages are
recoverable to "a reasonable time." J. McCARTHY, supra note 180, § 3.90; Cf. B. Sci &
P. GRossmAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIHNATION LAW 1434 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing "front pay"
for employees discriminatorily terminated).
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become liable. 229 In the employment context it is clear, however, that
the discharged employee's refusal to accept different or inferior
employment will not affect the plaintiff's damage recovery. In fact,
the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the rejected
employment was in fact comparable, or substantially similar, to that
held by the plaintiff before termination. 2 0 Where there are few jobs
available for a person with the plaintiff's skills, there may be no
basis for the discharged employee to mitigate damages.
21
1
2. Emotional Distress Damages
Damages for emotional distress are rarely permitted in an action
based in contract.3 2 This limitation is not so much the result of
considered analysis nor rigid adherence to contract damages law as
"[a] limitation more firmly rooted in tradition." 231 California adheres
to the general view that emotional distress damages are not recov-
erable for breach of contract. 2 4 In fact, California's adherence to
the Hadley v. Baxendale limitation on consequential damages 235 had
led to infrequent awards of emotional distress damages because
generally emotional distress damages are not within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting and are, thus, not recoverable
in an action for breach of contract. Courts, however, must guard
against unthinkingly assuming that in no contract action may the
229. 1 B. WrrKaN, SuMMARY oF CAUiFORN A LAW, CONTRACTS § 857 (9th ed. 1987).
230. Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 183, 474 P.2d 689,
692, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1972). Courts appear willing to scrutinize the position asserted
by the employer to be similar. See id.
231. See Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, 378 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. 1985)
(award of $740,000 in lost compensation appropriate where it had been impossible for the
plaintiff to secure comparable employment).
232. E.A. FARNSWORTH supra note 37, § 12.17; Note, Bad Faith Tort, supra note 217, at
369.
233. E.A. FARswoRm, supra note 37, § 12.17.
234. Sawyer v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145
Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1978). Unlike punitive damages, there is no statutory limitation barring
an award of emotional distress damages in a contract action. See supra note 219. In fact,
California statutory law suggests that emotional distress damages may be recoverable. See CAL.
Cirv. CODE § 3300 (West 1970) (providing that "for the breach of an obligation arising from
contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise provided by this Code, is the
amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.") See
also Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985)
(although plaintiff statutorily barred from punitive damages in contract action, damages for
emotional distress recoverable).
235. See supra note 217.
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plaintiff recover for emotional harm. Indeed, in certain contexts,
where the courts have found that the parties to the contract did
contemplate emotional distress damages flowing from breach, or
where due to the nature of the contract emotional distress damages
were particularly foreseeable, California courts have permitted recov-
ery for emotional harm.2 6 These cases are consistent with, not in
conflict with, the Hadley measure of damage.2 7
Although adherence to Hadley could lead to the recovery of
emotional distress damages in the context of breach of an employment
contract, courts have been unwilling to permit recovery in the wrong-
ful termination context.23s Yet, it is well recognized that contract
236. See, e.g., Ross v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 995, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 473 (1984) (defendant's breach of contract to ensure private burial, promising to
bar unwanted guests, makes defendant liable for the plaintiff's emotional distress, even absent
physical manifestations because the contract by its nature put the defendant on notice that a
breach would result in emotional and mental suffering by the plaintiff.); Windeler v. Scheers
Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 852, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (1970) (jeweler liable for emotional
distress damages caused by breach of contract leading to destruction of plaintiff's heirloom
where defendant specifically was aware of sentimental value). See generally B. WmUN,
SumARy oF CAMUoRaaA LAW, Contracts, §§ 829-832 (9th ed. 1987).
237. See Goldberg, Emotional Distress Damages and Breach of Contract: A New Approach,
20 U.C. DAVIS L. Ray. 57 (1986). After announcing her "new test" calling for emotional
distress damages when "at the time of contracting, the promisor can foresee that emotional
distress will flow from the breach," an application of the traditional Hadley test to emotional
distress claims, (Id. at 57-58), Goldberg goes on to refine the test as follows:
If a contract has an emotional aspect [which she defines as either emotional events,
emotional objects, or emotional interests], it is foreseeable that emotional distress
will flow from a breach .... This means that courts cannot preclude emotional
distress damages entirely because an element of business is involved, but will award
damages commensurate with the emotional aspects known to both parties at the
time of contract formation.
Id. at 60. But see Traynor, supra note 217, at 12 (suggesting that the Hadley rule would need
to be relaxed to permit recovery of broader compensatory damages flowing from the breach
of an employment contract).
238. See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071,
1081 n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 n.4 (1983); "It has long been established that an employer
cannot be held liable in a breach of contract action for changes to the employee's health, or
for injuries to his feelings or reputation, by reason of wrongful discharge, though it be alleged
that his discharge was malicious. [Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 342-43, 73 P.
1055, 1056 (1903)]. To whatever extent plaintiff's complaint alleges that such damages arose
from a breach of contract, it fails to state a cause of action." Id. See also Foley v Interactive
Data Corp.,, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 702, 765 P.2d 373, 403, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 241 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (although no California case has permitted emotional distress
recovery for breach of a promise in the employment setting, "in many cases the employer is
aware at the time of the contract that bad faith discharge will create great mental and emotional
distress."). It seems difficult to conceive of a situation where a bad faith discharge would not
cause emotional upset. Cf. Cole v. Fair Oaks, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987) ("Indeed, it would be unusual for an employee not to suffer
emotional distress as a result of an unfavorable decision by his employer.").
See also Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1984). In Valentine,
the Michigan Supreme Court forthrightly admits that emotional distress damages fall within
1056
1989 / California's Developing Law of Wrongful Termination
damages are compensatory in nature. 2 9 If the purpose of contract
damages is to compensate the injured party, it does not necessarily
follow that damages for breach should exclude damages flowing from
the breach that will truly compensate the injured party.
The employment context proves a particularly compelling arena
for permitting emotional distress damage recovery.? This is especially
true in those situations in which an employee successfully asserts an
implied-in-fact agreement not to terminate absent just cause. The
factors considered to find the implied-in-fact promise in the first
place are factors that render emotional distress particularly foresee-
able. The employee's longevity most critically establishes the foresee-
ability of emotional distress flowing from the employer's breach of
contract. The longer a person works for an employer, the more likely
it is that the employee has an expectation of continued employment. 24
Employer assurances, promotions and bonuses may increase the
likelihood that emotional distress will also flow from the wrongful
termination of the employee. This will be particularly the case where
the employer knows that the employee has rejected possible other
employment in order to remain with the employer. 2 Also, where
the employer makes express representations of job security, modifying
the Hadley rule as they foreseeably flow from the breach of an employment contract, that
failure to permit the plaintiff to recover for emotional harm fails to fully compensate for the
harm suffered, and that an employment contract has a "personal element" because "[e]mployment
is an important aspect of most persons' lives." 362 N.W.2d at 629. Nevertheless, the court
rejected emotional distress damages for breach of an employment contract "because an
employment contract is not entered into primarily to secure the protection of personal interests
[the court finding that the primary purpose in forming such contracts is economic] and
[because] pecuniary damages can be estimated with reasonable certainty." 362 N.W.2d. at 630.
239. See supra note 216-220. This is expressly recognized by the Foley court. Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227
(1988).
240. See Goldberg, supra note 237, at 95-98.
241. At some point, to be determined on a case by case basis, the employee develops "an
interest in security of continuing employment." Id. at 98. Goldberg suggests that courts may
create a statutory presumption that an interest in security arises after a certain number of
years of employment, such as five. If the employee has worked beyond the years required for
the presumption, the employer must then show that security was specifically precluded. If the
employee has worked less than the number of years required for the presumption, then the
employee has the burden of showing that an interest in security has arisen. Id. While longevity
clearly is a compelling factor for the recovery of emotional distress damages, any such
presumption should be legislatively created. Further, in most cases the specific nature of the
employment relationship needs to be examined to determine what was in the contemplation of
the parties.
242. Matters specifically within the knowledge of the employer may create liability for
more than emotional distress. If an employer, for example, authorizes a bank loan to an
employee because the employee is purchasing a home, subsequent wrongful discharge may
make the employer liable for house payments that the discharged employee is now unable to
make, as well as for the employee's emotional distress.
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the at-will employment contract, emotional distress will likely flow
from a subsequent breach.
Further, if the agreement not to terminate absent just cause arises
as a result of an express or implied contract modification, it is only
reasonable that the foreseeability of the harm be assessed at the time
of the modification, rather than at the time the original employment
agreement is formed. The harm likely to flow from the breach of
an obligation to terminate only for just cause cannot be measured
until the contract in issue contains such an obligation - an obligation
which is created only at the time of modification.
Accordingly, where a discharged employee establishes breach of a
promise to terminate only for just cause, created by express or
implied employer manifestations, emotional distress damages may be
recoverable depending on the circumstances and what specific knowl-
edge is possessed by the employer. Some suggest that emotional
distress damages be permitted only where the defendant's breach is
in "bad faith." 243 A more logical approach is to permit emotional
distress damages in accordance with the dictates of Hadley, when
emotional distress damages would be reasonably foreseeable from
breach of the employment contract, and to permit emotional distress
damages where the employer acts in "bad faith" by asserting a
pretextual basis for the discharge, regardless of whether the emotional
distress damages fall within the scope of Hadley.2"
G. Seaman's After Foley
In Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., 4W the
California Supreme Court was expected to decide whether the breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in a commercial
contract-" could lead to tort damages.247 Rather than forthrightly
243. .See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 702, 765 P.2d at 403, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting and concurring) ("[I]n many cases the employer is aware at the time of the contract
that bad faith discharge will create great mental and emotional distress.") (emphasis added);
Traynor, supra note 212, at 13.
244. This would reinstate some of the deterrence against pretextual discharge removed by
the Foley decision. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
245. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (1984). See generally Note, Sailing
the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
69 MnN. L. Rsv. 1161 (1985).
246. See supra note 155-157.
247. The California Supreme Court had previously held that the breach of the implied
covenant could be tortious in the insurance context. See supra note 55. The court also had
suggested that the same might be true in the employment context. See supra note 50.
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deciding that issue, the court, instead, held that a "party to a contract
may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract,
it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and
without probable cause, that the contract exists." 24
Care must be taken to distinguish a Seaman's cause of action for
bad faith refusal to recognize the existence of a valid contract ("bad
faith refusal") from an action based on tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing ("tortious breach"). Despite
the efforts of the Seaman's court to proclaim that its decision was
premised on a tort basis distinct from tortious breach,2 9 later au-
248. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d
1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984). The court contended that it was unnecessary to
decide the admitted "principal issue" of "whether and under what circumstances, a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a commercial contract may give rise to
an action in tort." Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. See Gomez v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 921, 928, 215 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1985) (the court did not
"decid[e] whether breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would support tort
remedies in the ordinary commercial context .... "); Note, Bad Faith Tort, supra note 217, at
363 (noting that, although the court extended tort liability to general commercial contracts, it
"skirt[ed] the bad faith tort doctrine issue"); Note, Contort: Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commerical Contracts-Its Existence
and Desirability, 60 NoTRE D~mE L. Rnv. 510, 520 (1985) ("Thus, in Seaman's, the California
Supreme Court recognized the new tort of wrongful denial of the existence of a contract, but
avoided the question whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in a commercial contract always gives rise to an action in tort."); Traynor, supra note 212, at
11 ("[T]he court in Seaman's recognized a new tort of 'stonewalling' and avoided ruling that
the tort results from a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
The court's narrow approach has been criticized. See, e.g., Comment, Reconstructing Breach
of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1291,
1302 n.63 (1985) ("Seaman's is too narrow, since it creates an artificial distinction between
disputing the existence of a contract and disputing duties, performance and other aspects of
the bargaining process."). But see Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach's Corp., 162
Cal. App. 3d 241, 252, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532 (1984) ("The court found it unnecessary [in
Seaman's] to directly address the issue [of tortious breach], enunciating a broader princi-
ple.... .") (emphasis added).
One author suggests that the court was concerned about bad faith conduct by the contracting
parties in Seaman's but, after having the case under submission for twenty-seven months, was
unable to reach "any agreement on the rationale for developing the law coherently," thereby
creating the confusing, ill-defined new tort of bad faith denial. Traynor, supra note 212, at 12.
249. In fact, the majority advised caution in determining the scope and application of tort
remedies arising from the breach of a commercial contract because of the difficulty in
distinguishing between breach of the covenant and breach of the underlying contract, and
because tort damages might frustrate the contracting parties' expectations. Seaman's, 36 Cal.
3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. Further, it was because the majority
refused to base their holding on a finding of tortious breach that former Chief Justice Bird
refused to join the full opinion. She took issue with the majority, explaining:
A contracting party should not be able to deny the existence of a valid contract in
order to shield itself from liability for breach of that contract. Today, the court holds
that an action will lie in tort against such conduct. However, it refuses to acknowledge
that its holding is compelled by this court's past decisions analyzing the scope of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 775-76, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., concurring
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thorities have expressly or impliedly interpreted Seaman's as basing
its holding on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing., 0
By the careful terms of the court, Seaman's creates a new tort,
separate and independent from tortious breach.2'
Courts began to attempt to interweave the Seaman's rationale into
their disposition of wrongful termination cases. 52 Once again, con-
fusion arose about the distinction between a bad faith refusal cause
of action and an action for tortious breach.23
and dissenting). She went on to argue that "[w]hen a breaching party acts in bad faith to shield
itself entirely from contract damages ... the duty of good faith and fair dealing is violated."
Id. at 778, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
250. See Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum, 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 321, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820,
832 (1986) (erroneously stating that the "holding" in Seaman's was that "bad faith denial of
the existence of a contract breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing"). See also, B.
WIan, Strm nY oF CALotFomIA LAw, CONTRACTS § 752 (9th ed. 1987) ("The implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is breached, and a tort action lies, where a party attempts to
avoid liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, the contract exists .... ),"
(citing Seaman's); Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. Rnv. 1161, 1179 (1985) (asserting that the
Seaman's court "should not have extended liability to a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing"); see also infra note 253.
251. See, e.g., Elxsi v. Kukje Am. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1987). As
Judge Aguilar notes, the exact parameters of this separate tort are fuzzy; it is uncertain whether
the tort may encompass only the bad faith denial of the existence of a contract, or whether
the tort also includes bad faith denial of liability. Id. at 1296-97. Ultimately, Judge Aguilar
decided that the new tort arises only upon bad faith denial of the existence of a contract. Id.
at 1298. Accord Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984). On the
other hand, the Seaman's majority relies on an Oregon case, in which the defendants were
liable in tort for threatening to file unjustified litigation unless the plaintiff paid them more
than was justifiably due them under the contract. Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, Inc., 556
P.2d 679 (Or. 1976). In this case tort liability arose from the defendants' conduct of obtaining
excess payment "without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of the cause of
action." Adams, 556 P.2d at 681. The case did not involve bad faith denial of the existence
of the contract and reliance by the Seaman's court on this case may suggest an intent that the
cause of action extend beyond bad faith denial of a contract.
The California high court's creation of the new tort has caused significant confusion. As
Judge Kozinski bluntly put it: the Seaman's tort is a creation of the "Cloud Cuckooland of
modem tort theory." Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech International, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314.
Judge Kozinski continued: "In inventing the tort of bad faith denial of a contract, . . . the
California Supreme Court has created a cause of action so nebulous in outline and so
unpredictable in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window
than a rule of law.... [ ] It is impossible to draw a principled distinction between tortious
denial of a contract's existence and a permissible denial of liability under the terms of the
contract." Id. at 315. Judge Krozinski may overstate the problem, however. As Seaman's itself
indicates, there is a distinction between breaching a contract and refusing to recognize the
existence of the obligation, although at times the distinction appears blurry.
252. See, e.g., Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 548-9, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5,
18-19 (1988) (employee's proof of employer's bad faith denial of employment contract may
permit recovery for tortious breach); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1170-
2, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829-830 (1986) (where employer asserts good cause for discharge without
probable cause and in bad faith, an action for tortious breach will lie); Rulon-Miller v.
International Business Mach's. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 252-253, 206 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532-
533 (1984).
253. See, e.g., Heimadi, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (the court held that
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Clearly the majority's decision in Foley now forecloses a tort action
in the employment context based upon the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The central question that
arises is whether the independent Seaman's tort of bad faith refusal
has continuing vitality in the employment context. Although the exact
scope of the cause of action will need to be defined, the bad faith
denial cause of action survives the Foley decision.
The court in Foley does not consider the viability of a Seaman's
action, although the majority makes clear its disagreement with the
approach asserted by the Koehrer court that tortious breach can arise
in the employment context where there is a pretextual assertion of
good cause. 4 The Foley majority, without explanation or citation to
authority, then went on to state:
Koehrer thus extended the expressly circumscribed cause of action
established in Seaman's based on denial of the existence of the
contract, to find a tort cause of action when the dispute related to
a contract term, namely the necessity for good cause as a basis for
termination. By this broad stroke, made without analyzing the
appropriateness of imposing tort remedies in the employment context,
the Koehrer court broached the possibility of imposing tort damages
for the breach of any term of a contract whether for employment
or otherwise.25
The majority's point is uncertain and potentially unfounded. To
the extent that the majority contends that Koehrer's reliance on
Seaman's as a basis for permitting a tortious breach action is mis-
placed, the majority is surely correct. Bad faith denial and tortious
breach are separate and distinct causes of action.2
6 The intimation
an employee who has established an implied promise that he or she will not be terminated
absent cause may pursue the "implied covenant tort remedy" upon proof of bad faith denial
of the existence of a contract). This focus is misplaced, however. The employer's bad faith
denial is a tort unto itself; it need not be the basis for an action for tortious breach. See also
Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (where the court acknowledges that
the Seaman's court expressly stated its holding is not based upon breach of the implied covenant,
but then proceeds to proclaim that the court did not mean what it said because "it is difficult
otherwise to understand its [the court's] repeated reference to 'good faith' and 'bad faith' ").
The Foley court took issue with the Koehrer court's interpretation of Seaman's. See infra note
254 and accompanying text.
254. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 765 P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231. See supra notes
152-153 (discussing Foley's creation of a lack of deterrence against pretextual discharge). The
court took issue with the Koehrer court's assertion that the Seaman's majority did not mean
what it said and did in fact base its holding on tortious breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Id.
255. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 765 P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
256. See supra notes 248-253. The court may be suggesting that the employer's assertion of
a lack of liability under a contractual provision, even in bad faith, does not create a Seaman's
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that a Seaman's action, if premised on bad faith denial of the existence
of a valid contractual promise not to terminate absent just cause,
could not apply in the employment context, does not follow, however.
First, the majority's assertion that a bad faith denial cause of action
is less appropriate in the employment realm than in the commercial
context is bewildering. The Seaman's cause of action originated in
the context of commercial contracts and, if a Seaman's cause of
action permitting tort recovery is appropriate in the commercial
context, there is no logical basis for foreclosing a tort action in the
context of employment contracts. The commercial contract arena is
the area in which courts and commentators urge the greatest caution
before permitting a potential tort recovery.2 7 In the context of em-
ployment contracts, which more closely approximate contracts for
insurance than do commercial contracts, the distinction is unfounded.
Second, the court's distinction between "contract" and "contract
terms" is also unsupported.55 Whether an implied-in-fact promise to
terminate only for cause constitutes a separate contract, or whether
it constitutes an implied-in-fact modification to the original employ-
ment contract, the effect is the same. In fact, it is uncertain what is
the appropriate characterization of conduct or words by the employer
which leads an employee to reasonably believe he or she may only
be terminated for cause despite an employment relationship that was
initially terminable at will. If an employment contract, silent about
duration is formed at the outset, the law implies a term that it is
terminable at will. 5 9 Because of subsequent conduct by the employer,
an employee may justifiably assert that he or she is terminable only
cause of action. The employer's conduct instead would be based on breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounding solely in contract after Foley. As one judge
explains: "Denial of liability in bad faith and without probable cause is squarely within the
realm of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To deny liability on a contract is to deny
the other party the rightful employment of the benefits of the contract." Elxsi v. Kukje Am.
Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Yet, the distinction between denying the
existence of a contract and denying a contractual obligation under an existing contract is not
an easy one to make. As one author points out, this distinction is "artificial, and applying it
to oral contracts or loosely written contracts seems unworkable." Traynor, supra note 212, at
11. While the distinction is difficult, later cases will have to tackle this issue and provide
guidance as to the proper parameters of the Seaman's cause of action.
257. It was precisely because the commercial arena was involved that the Seaman's court
declined to base their holding on tortious breach. See supra note 249. See also Note, Contort,
supra note 248, at 518; Louderback & Jurika, supra note 55, 16 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 187, 200-201
(1982). See also supra notes 112-113.
258. See, e.g., Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 891, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402
(1984) (Seaman's may suggest that the unfounded protest of any contract term is tortious). In
fact, the distinction is contrary to contract law.
259. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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for cause. Does the just cause provision create a new implied-in-fact
contract, or is there simply an implied-in-fact modification of the
original employment contract such that termination solely for cause
is only one of several contract terms? Courts have not bothered to
make this distinction, speaking about implied-in-fact promises not to
terminate absent cause, implied-in-fact contracts and implied-in-fact
modification, treating all as identical in effect. 20
If the Pugh criteria are satisfied, Foley makes clear that an implied-
in-fact promise not to terminate absent just cause arises. Can there
be a tort action arising from the bad faith refusal to recognize this
implied-in-fact contract? Although Seaman's deals with an express
contract, there is no conceptual difference if the underlying contract
is implied-in-fact. 26' Thus, a tort action premised on the employer's
bad faith refusal to recognize the existence of a valid implied-in-fact
promise not to terminate the employee absent good cause should be
actionable. 262
260. The Foley court also uses these terms interchangeably. The court notes that, because
Foley bases his claim that he is terminable only for good cause on the employer's course of
conduct, his cause of action is "one for breach of an implied-in-fact contract." Foley, 47 Cal.
3d at 675, 765 P.2d at 383, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221. Later the majority characterizes the situation
as one of "implied-in-fact modification." Id. at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr.
at 225 n.23.
Although the ultimate legal effect is identical, implied-in-fact limitations are based on employer
conduct while express contracts can be created by written or oral manifestations. See supra note
37.
261. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1199 (9th
Cir. 1986) (applying California law). The court explained: "Defendants argue that to apply the
Seaman's doctrine to an implied-in-fact contract would unduly extend state law. we reject this
argument because under California law implied-in-fact contract is, like an express one, a 'true'
contract." Id. California law correctly comports with the general law of contract; an implied-
in-fact contract is entitled to equal treatment as an express contract, both being formed by
mutual assent. J. CAtAmm AND J. Pmuao, CONTRACTs § 19 (1987). See also supra note 37.
262. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 754, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 202
(1988). The Pugh II court suggests that a Seaman's action may be appropriate in the implied-
in-fact context, noting:
See's counsel concede in summation that See's had a long-standing, unwritten policy
that employees would not be discharged unless their work performance was unsatis-
factory, that is, without good cause. Wve are cited to no evidence in the record, and
we find none, that See's denied the existence of an implied contract to discharge
appellant only for good cause. Instead, See's focused its evidence on the issues of
whether it acted in good faith and had good cause for the discharge.
Id. Clearly focusing on the bad faith denial of the employment agreement itself is misplaced
as there is little likelihood that an employer would deny that there was an at-will contractual
employment arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant. See supra note 142. But see
Hejmadi, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 548-49, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (tortious breach action where
defendant without probable cause denies the existence of the employment contract.) The Hejmadi
court appeared generally confused about the proper role of a Seaman's action in the employment
context. See supra note 253.
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Although conceptually, there appears no reason why a Seaman's
action cannot arise in the context of an implied-in-fact contract, it
seems factually unlikely that a Seaman's cause of action would be
viable except in the most unusual of situations. Under Pugh, and
now Foley, the confluence of a variety of factors-the "totality of
the circumstances"2 3-wiU lead a court to find, at some undefined
point, that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury may rea-
sonably find that an employer's conduct has created an implied-in-
fact promise that the employee is terminable only for good cause.
To prevail in an action for bad faith denial it is not enough that
the plaintiff shows that the employer's assurances, practices and
longevity have reasonably led to an implied-in-fact promise that the
employee be terminated only for good cause. Termination absent just
cause would be an action for breach of contract. To prove an action
sounding in tort, the challenge confronting the plaintiff is proving
that the defendant-employer acted in "bad faith," which in this
context is defined as denying the contractual obligation "without
probable cause and with no belief in the existence of the defense." ' 26
An honest, but mistaken, belief that there is a legitimate basis to
contest the existence of the contract is enough to foreclose a finding
of "bad faith."6 Thus, a tort action requires greater proof than the
actual existence of an implied-in-fact obligation, the existence of which
is being disputed by the employer. Because the formation of the
implied-in-fact contract is often the result of the convergence of
several factors that are deemed to create a reasonable expectation on
the part of the employee that he or she is no longer terminable at
will, it will be the rare case that the employer's denial of an implied-
in-fact obligation to terminate only for just cause will be in "bad
faith.' '26
Where, however, there is employee reliance on provisions in the
personnel policies and handbooks which assert that employees will be
terminated only for just cause, leading the employee to assert an
implied-in-fact promise to terminate only for cause, a Seaman's action
263. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 681, 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226. See also Burton v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. App. 3d 979, 977, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (1988). See supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
264. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 770, 686 P.2d 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
265. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1165, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
266. If an employer has two employees in identical, or virtually identical, situations and
one has successfully sued the employer on a Pugh theory, if the employer later discharges the
second employee and denies that there is any obligation to terminate that employee solely for
just cause, tort damages may then follow since this would arguably be a bad faith denial.
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is more tenable. The employer's assertion that there is no such
obligation may give rise to a Seaman's action provided that there are
clear employer policies that are contrary to the employer's assertions.
Bad faith may be suggested by the fact that it was the employer who
adopted and promulgated the policies in issue. Assertions by the
employer that these are inapplicable may prove lack of probable
cause.
Another context in which a bad faith denial may lie is where the
plaintiff asserts an oral modification. In these cases there may be a
stronger basis for recovery than where the basis of the action is an
implied-in-fact promise. Where, through words, the employer has
modified the employment agreement so that the employee may be
terminated only for cause, the employer may be liable in tort for bad
faith refusal to recognize this obligation. Termination absent cause
would subject the employer to contract damages only after Foley; but
if the employer asserts in bad faith-without a good cause belief that
there is no contractual modification-that there has been no express
agreement that the employee is terminable only for just cause, a
Seaman's action logically may follow.
The bad faith denial cause of action arises when the employer-in
bad faith and without probable cause-denies the obligation to ter-
minate only for just cause. This is wholly distinct from cases where
the employer terminates an employee who later proves an implied-in-
fact promise that he or she will be terminated solely for just cause.
The termination absent just cause, though wrongful, constitutes breach
of a contract, leading to contract remedies only.67 The bad faith
denial action may now also be construed as inapplicable in cases
where the employer, though recognizing a promise to terminate the
employee only for just cause, has created unfounded and pretextual
assertions of good cause.3
In Foley, the majority limits a wrongfully discharged employee's
tort remedies in the employment context. Nevertheless, the opinion
does not erase the bad faith denial cause of action from California
law and, indeed, may strengthen the need for the bad faith denial
cause of action. Where an employer attempts to avoid liability "for
nonperformance of contractual obligations which it privately recog-
267. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App, 3d 1155, 1171, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830
(1986) ("[A]n allegation that the defendant's discharge of plaintiff was without good cause
would charge nothing more than a breach of contract.").
268. See supra note 254.
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nized to be binding," 2 9 the need for a tort cause of action arises.
This conduct constitutes more than a "mere breach of contract"; it
"offends acceptable notions of business ethics," 270 and is tortious. 271
Only later cases will define the scope of the Seaman's cause of action
in this, as well as in other, contexts.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has breathed a little new life into
the highly criticized at-will doctrine, an awkward relic from a time
long gone. Simultaneously, the court cautiously acknowledged the
need for limitations to the at-will doctrine; implicitly recognizing the
need to provide greater protection for workers so that the balance
between the employer's "freedom to make ecomomically based de-
cisions about their work force" will be properly weighed against the
worker's right to adequate redress in cases of "certain forms of
'wrongful' termination ... ."272 In suggesting a starting point, the
court embraced the law of contracts, modernized and liberalized, as
a basis to protect certain employees from unjust termination. Further,
the court reviewed the badly muddled decisions providing a tort
recovery for breach of the implied covenant in the employment context
and, rather than trying to define the parameters of the cause of
action, took an easier, though more dramatic step, and abolished the
entire cause of action for tortious breach. It is hoped that the court's
abdication may lead to legislative action, and, in turn, to a more
understandable, coherent and just balance in the employment context.
In the interim, California courts will still have to grapple with thorny
issues unresolved and, in some cases, created by the Foley decision. 273
269. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 771, 686 P.2d at 1168, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
270. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
271. Surely, if a tort action for bad faith denial will not "intrude upon the bargaining
relationship or upset reasonable expectations of the contracting parties" in the commercial
contract setting, it will surely not do so in the employment context. See supra note 257.
272. Foley, 47 Cal.3d at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (1988).
273. Another effect of Foley may be a renewed interest in unionization. The foremost goal
of legislation regulating the workplace during this century had been to promote "unionization
as a countervailing force against employer power and control." Note, Protecting At Will
Employees, 93 HA1v. L. REv. 1816, 1827 (1980). while union membership has been declining
nationally and in California, (see supra note 1) the Foley decision may have unwittingly created
a persuasive argument in favor of a resurgence of unionization. See Gould, Stemming the
Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 Emp. RE.. L.J. 404, 417 (1987) (Because
union membership is declining, employees turned to wrongful termination actions to redress
their injuries.)
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